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THE I NDUS  TR I AL AND C OI.ITIIERC I AL ST-BAIE9!-.QI.-J.APAI{
INTRODUCTION ..........,:....'..'......'.-.-
This study describes t!9 evotutjpn of Japanrs industriaI  and
commerciaL strategi sin.. 1945 and the prospects for the 1980s. Besides
indicating the policies'and officiat neasures that have been used to
shape theie devetopments,  the docunent considers the .undert{ing.industriat
structure.of Japan and tire changes that have occurrqd in individuaI sectors.
'  The studv is divided into three parts:
I.  DeveLoPments 1945-1910
A sunmary of the resutts achieveO. f,fling the nost-r'ar
reconstrlction period and in the. high-groyth years of
the 1950s and 1960s.
II.  Japanrs Present Position
A description of the position Japgn reachbd by the end
of ttre' 1970s and. deveLoprnents  during that decade, rhich
againsawhighgrorthandafurther:advance-'intonev
sectorl]"a. i.tr  it  itti need to grapple nith the probtens
reiutting f ron the rise in oi"l' n1i ces'  :
III.  The perspectives for the'1980s
A survey of the outLook during the 19E0s, as this e{nerges
.  from ott.iciaL studies and reports made by the teading
JaPanese  regearch institutes'
- | - -^,
The final.:section.is evidentty specuLative in that it  invo[ves  a
number of uncertain factors, but sufficient is knorn or can reasonabty
U" 
".rum"d 
to enabLe an account to be given 91 lttt direction Japanls
industriaI and commdrciaI strategy appears Like[y'.to take during the
years'immediateLy ahead.
trlore generatty, it  is not possibLe in a docunent of th'is kind to give
a compLete Oer..ipiion of the devetopmellt:9f the Japanese economy since
1945 and'of'aLt t'he etenents that have inf[uenced this.'  The study is
i"r"r;".liy  ooncentrated on vhat appear'to be the.main aspects, in particuLar
itr"r"'of speciaL interest from the vierpoint of the Community and its llember
States and EC industries. tilore detaited information on certain issues ahd
a senies of tables. are contained in,the Annex to the text.
; catled to the other studies rhich the commission staff
have prepared'and which provide suppLementary information (1)' 
:
(1) -Initiat  AnaLysis  O'f the Concentration of Japanese Exports^to the -- 
European Community.. comnission staff paper, 9:Februqry 19!1.
-Struiture et perspectives de Itindustrie automobi[e japonaise -
stratAgies industrietLes et comnerciates. F6vrier 1981.
-Structure and prospects of the Japanese Cotour TeLevision  Industry.
lrlar ch 1 981 .
-Structures et stiategiesl Ae trindustrie iaponiise de' [a machine-outit'
i-i'li'-issr --2-
PART I.  DEVELOPI'IENTS,  1945-1970
Summary. Japan has undergone tuo major medium-term investment cyctes
ffifp4s,-;;J  a third is norl in proiress. The first  of these cvctes
in the 1950s was devoted to the deveLdpment of basic and heavy industries.
The second was concentrated  On efforts.to improve production processes,
'in partiiuLar in sectors engaged- in targe-scate manufacturing (e'g' in
the case of.consumer  goods)., The third cycte, t{hich uiLI have been
."rpt"irO by about 1trr1F-85, is  intended, xhi[e improving the energy-efficiency
of the economy, io strengtlren branches of Japanese industry rhich vitI  be
increasingty cnaracte.isJO by high technology, high val'ue-added  production'
In the course of this devetopment  the airis of officia[  poLicies have
changed considerab[y,  from focu3ing on the. buiLding up of the basic
economy (e.g. steeL, coaL) to 
"n.oJraging 
high-growth rates in a range of
areas (".g,  cars, optics, cameragr etectronics., ratcheS) and, SinCe the
1973 oiL ihock, the'adopiion of rt"tu."t  to adjust producti.on.(ship-building,
atuminium) and to foster development in seLected fieLds judged to be of
cruciaL importance for the future (e.g. microproce.ssdrsr. energy-saving
research). (1)  The means used to bring out thdse bro.ad shifts have atso
evotved. During the post-Tar reconstruction period direct governmentat
intervention uas widespread. This ras fotLoved by the developnent  of a
looser and more consensuat system in vhich, through an etaborate-process
of consUttation amongst ttre nrajor parties involved (government,  in particutar
the bureauc?acy, indistriaI  and business sectors), agreement has been
reached on the obiectives to be pursued and the ray in t{hjch these are to
be impLemented. The Government and trlinistries (notabLy the trlinistry of
InternationaL Trade and Industry (illTI), and the llin'istry of Finance) have
played, and retain, the Leading r6l.e in deyising.policies and in "naster-
minding,, their .ppiication,, ana in providing-various forms of "guidance".
The consuLtation process and consensus buiLdjng have atrays been of centrat
irpo.ii"."  however. The use of direct pouers has tended to decl:ine in many
areas as the Japanese economy has become stronger and as industries have
become [ess dependent on officiat  hetp.
Japan nade unparal.Ieted progress. uhereas Japanfs GDf vas.relativety'
smatI at the start'of  the perioUiZl, Japan had overtaken the United Kingdom
by'1967, France in 1968 and the feaeraL RepubLic of Germany in 1969' Japanrs
GDp is noy roughii.qu"t to that of Germany  and ltaLy combined and about
tyo-fifths of thai of the united states(3)-.  GDP per head of population is
ctose to the average for the European CommunitY. ,In externat trade, Japanrs.
share of wortO expJrts-increased  from 0.52 in igag to 7.97. in 1980(4)' Japanrs
exports have growl ouu."LI at a faster rate than worLd exports of manufactured
I
goods as a rhole.
(1) Not'atf of Japan's endeavours have been successfut;  the aircraft industry
has not deveLoped-on u major scale and attempts to merge efforts in the
cornputer fietcl in the 1970s did not prove fruitfuL'
(2) Japanr s
(3) GDP in
US  = 21575
Japan:1r080
EC-10:21800
Denmark = 
66
F.R.G.  '-  82,4
Greece :  42
France :  655
Iretand z  17
\  ItaLY z  394
Neths, :  159
Betgium :  118
Lux.  = 
4
'  U.K.  :  518
GDP
1980
uas a third of that. of the united Kingdom in 1950'
(at market prices) (in I  bn.) :
(Source: Estimate of Commission Staff)
(4) For detaiLs of evolution and comparative figures for EC see subsequent
tabtes' in particuLar that on page 11'As a resuLt of uar-time destruction and the toss of overseas
territories, efforts *".a centred on reconstructing  the economy' . As in
Europe, this invofveA tne major areas of food suppLy' housing  and-.
transport. uackini-in-.",  ""t".iaLs 
and food, Japan sought from the
beginning to reUui[d and strengthen its industry in order to pay for
imports. Coat "ni-tt""I 
proAuction received initiiI  priority in the
attocation of scarce rau materiaLs, energy and. capitat (the "Priority
production Roticy;'i. Other basic industiies rhich Here fostered rere
poyer generation, ,iiL transport .anJ ihe cnemicat industry (fertitisers)'
By the earIy 1950s,;;;-;;; I!u"it-oi p.oAuction,had  broadtv been achieved
in basic and heavy industries, a Tajoi impulse coming from the increased
demand uhich resulted frorn the Korean Uar'
A range of means re.e useJ to shape these devetopments, Uith a shift
fromthenoredi.;;l-contro[sinstitutedduringtheAmericanoccupation
after 1945, to a more gradual and pervasive syslen as the Japanese adnini-
stration got into its ltrid".  The'uinding-up of the Econonic StabiLisation
Board in lg11.signified the end of the period of direct governmentaL inter-
vention. the means 
"iptoyua 
may be ctasslfied as-domestic-market related'
monetary and fit."ir-"lJ-iorelgn-trade reLated. The domestic-rnarket
measures were designed to promote p"oauction in.the heavy and chenicat
indust ri es by pr"uini ing- e..ati c pri ce. f Luctuations'through  government
bontroLs, encouraging  economies-oi scate, and acceLerating  technotogicaL
progress through if,."prt.ftase ot.foreign "knott-hoH"' Sectorat cartets rere
?orileO in'certiin in.i"n.es to aid the rationatisation process
AsregardsmonetaryandfiscaLmeasures,theyen,|.ikeot.her.currencies,
operatedunderth;';;;i;tottixedexchangeiatesuhichtasteduntil'1971(1)
Credit and capital l,ere generatty in shori supply. A pubLic body, the
Reconstruction Finance Bank, rhich operated betHeen 1947 and 1952t VaS
responsibleforp'o"ialnginitiaIcapitaL.tobasicSectorssuchaspoUer
generation, steeL, coaL and fertitiser industries' 0ther financiaL institutions
estabt.ished *"ru-[n*-J"p"n DeveLopment Bank, the_Export-rmport  Bank
and the  SmaLL Business fin"nce-fofporatlon: Tl" Japan Developnent Bank
loans carried interest rates torer than narket rates; initiaLLy prov'ided to
heavy and chemi."i ina"triest these Here progressi.vetY, "tt:!:d-to 
other
areas. The Bank of Japan (the ceniraL ban'k) provided the cornmerciat banks
uith guidance ", iig"ii,  tttu..eai'i io u. supplied to meet capital demands'
Government-inposed  ceiLings on tfro.tli..m tending rates. vhich Iasted untiL
the mid-1970s, xere of fundamentai  itpo.t"nce for the eipansion of Japan's
economy(2).IngeneraIthecom'erciatbanksregardedgovernmenttoansor
other signs of ofiiciaL encor."gui"nt-io.. projJct or industry as a sign
that they shouLd be supported, thus reinforcing the impact'
-3-
1. The Post-tfar Rec@
..1..
(1) The yen-dolLar valye remained at + 360 to the dotLar from 1949 to
ili''l'"ill .l"irl.,it.i"."'"i"ir'"-ttreci-or  exchanse rates and comparative
prices on externaL trade, see Annex, section 3'
Japan's interest-""i"  struc.ture has been l]?"::ll::9":::':Ir"::^i::?:^' (2) Japant s 'interest-rate  srruc luI-E rrcs ussr'
subject to u .o"'i;;;;i"'9e91ee :1 :1113'.:::::Y::t":,:"1"13?li?l'.n. il"i;:".ii""oi'ilunks in relation io totp"nv financins, see seneraL[v
note on Page 19 betow.-4-
Foreign trade uas*extensivety controLLed.  Imports rere governed
by a system of Licences  and quotasroperated.chiefty  by the lil'inistry of
InternationaL trale and rndustrv i'mi?ll, xhigl.ua: responsib[e for their
a[location betj1een-tufio.t  and iirms. t'tfff tikerise ptayed a major part
in determining the p".rr,"ru'ot to.lign technologl. The entry of foreigl1
investmqnts and technology uas ..grtJi"a by the-Foreign Exchange. and Trade
ControL Lan (1949) and the Foreigi Inu"rttent Lau (1950), which have onty
slorrLy been reLaxed (1).  A ,,Foreign cu.,"n.y BudgEt System,, operated to
atLocate the ti,nii"a amount of foriign currency avai[abl'e to priority
areas (besides irp"rat "i 
essentiai ioodstuffs and energyt for the heavy
and chemicats industries)
Even after the reconstruction of the basic'industries  had been
compLeted in the igsorr-ihe baLance-ot piyrnents'deficit  remained a major
constraint on economic gror.lth. Japanrs.exports recovered'more  slor[y in
fact than those of the 6th". O"u"ilp"O-economies'- Japan did not get back
to its pre-uar qu"niu, tevel of eipo.is untiL 1959 Q)r and even in that
year its exports iccounted for a ril"tr". percentage of rortd trade.then in
193g. Texti Les rere the targest single export sectgr (371 of totat exports
'in 1955 (3) ) .
2.  The High Growth Peri.od of the 1950s and 1960s
Du,r,ingthelg50sandlg60s,rhenGNPincreasedbygtol0Iayearin
reaI terms (4), i;;;;  Has a steidy shift in.Japanrs industriaL structure'
aray from t.Uou.lini"nriue torard's iapitaL-intensive sectors' notabLy in
the arbas of steeL and machinsrY A sotid' more broadty-based econony
emerged, shouing:it,"'iig". "t "'linkage 
effect.as eartier advances rere
consoLidated, The deveLopment  of ihe-steeL industry, rhe're production rose
rapidl"y, had a uf n"ii ci aL' ef f ect on itr" automobi te, ship and machinery
sectors, as uett-". in constructi;; activities. tire progress nade in petro-
chemicaLs  Led to further steps as-regards  pLastics and synthetic fibres'
Textites continued to be of,n"1oi;il;;;;^;;;  thoush aLreadv beginning their
retative dectine.
!:,
'  ..t.'.
(1) lrlost notabty by the amended version uh'ich cane into force on 1 Decemben
1 980.
"' ;::;$&lli:':?"?'*:::iili',.;Jf"lloi3'l:"o 
Japan"' 
'ECD 
document
(3) TextiLes had horever been 4EZ of ''!apanrs
1930. See tabtes on pp' 8 -  1O' shoring
distributjon between domestic and export
(4) Average rates of reaL GNP grouth rere :
(1955 -'1973) a Year'
exports in 1950 and 64X in
Japants Production and the
markets in various sectors'
g.1/ (946 - 1955) and 10'2I*:t  "  ,-. 1-
-5-
A seri'es of .nationaI pLans vhich,-vere producedrbeginnin  g in 1g55, served to set objectives  and the orierltations tor.Oevelopi"ni iil. Besides this overaIL frameuork, specifi. measures taken inctuded tax provisions for the modernisation qf facititiesr'rr"p,  to ensure the avaiI'abitity of risk and Loan capital, and rrriuined efforts to raise productivity  and encourage the use of-ney t".r,norogy e).  productivity
rose sharpty in the steet, nachinery and equipmeni";.;;;;r,
Japan joined GATT in 1955, al"though a nunber of signatories nade their acceptance conditionaL on the appLication of ArticLe XXXV treatnent. In the course of.!h9 foil.oring years Japan engaged in negotiations to rbduce these conditions. The "GeneraI brogr"ilri for the LiberaLisation of Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange',, rhich ras adopted bi.lipan in June'1960, had as its ain to raise ihe-percentige of goods ?.."i-t.* import restrictions fronr 401 to 80x in ihree yqi.s.  A faster Liberatisation pLan adopted later that same year set a tiberiiisation target of-gax yithin one vear. The degree of Liberatisation, uhich had been beloy 40x yhen
Japan entered GATT, reached approximateiy  932 in 1964. ruritr-er-steps taken inc[uded the ending of quanti'tative restrictions on 
"riorobite 
.imports
in  october  196s.  t  vr' evsvn'vY' 
r
In 1964 Japan reLaxed the controts on foreig,n exchange for current payments (except in the case of residuat import ibst.iction itens) and the foreign currency a[location system uas abotished.
The current account of the batance of payrnents continued in deficit unti [  1964, as a resutt of sharp increases in'inports due to the econonic expansion" tdith a further rise in exports, horever, the current account moved into surptus from 1965 untiL the oiL crisis o? 1973. J;;;n;"  exports greu.by 16.92 a year between 1961 and 196g, compared rith  a 9.62 rise in wortd exports. The main sectorat increases vere'in machinery and equipnent and in steel exports- lrlachinery and equipmentrrhich  had been IOI of total exports in the earty 1950s, increased to 46x by 1g7a, ship eipo;;r-;";;;-' 7'3% and motor vehicLes 6.i2.  steet products constiiuted  151 of exports in 1970. Textites dectined f rom 482 in 1950 to 't7a.et ii-igiO iil.' 
-"
(1) For a list  of the ptans and the resutts achieved see Annex, section 1. GNP rates exceeded those set in national ptans each year betyeen 1955 and 197a. The ttlITI "Vi.sions" of Japanrs econornyrtwhictr  6egan in the ear[y 1960s, also indicate the direction of officjal. thin[lng.
!?l nt regards R&D, besides the introduction of-specia[ tax incentives in 1967, the "Association of l'lining and Industriat TechnoLogy  Study Lau (1961)
encouraged  companies to undertake joint  studies, uhi t_e t[*  ,,sruriJy system for the Research and Development of Inportant TechpoLogy,, (196g) provided grants-in-aid to cover a portion of the cost incurred 5i priuuia ilrms engaged in R&D in the fieLds of energy, environment  and other tietds regaroea as 'important, the subsidy being repaid in the event of successfu[-devetopment. (3) see tabtes on pages I  :'12 for changes in industriaL production and export structure. rn a study made of the factors for Japanrs export-giortt over the decade 1961-71, it  has been estimated that:
4ozramefromthegrowttrJ?*uor[dr-ncom-eandinfeinalionattrade;
35'a  from sttucturaL change in Japane." r"nui".tured output (new products); 122  from the price compeiitiveness of Japanege  manufactured goods- (approx. equaItv divided betueen domestic devetopments;;J hig;"r foreign inftation);
6'71 from developments in commerciaL poticy through the Kennedy Round tariff  reduction;..  and,
6'a  from increased us p.o.urutent in s.E. Asia arising from the vietnam lfar.
Japanls exports increased in vaLue by g 19 bittion betyeen 1961-71.
(L. Krause and S" Sekiguchi, "Japan and. the l,Jorl.d Economy,,, in H. patrick
and H. Rosovskv, eds-, "Asia's NelLjjs$_; Hou the_$pgbele iconomy t{orks,,, Brookings Institute, tlZ
1002-6-
PART .,I I .  JAPAN  I S PRESENT PoSITI9N  .
a
1.  The position achjeved by Japan" Up ynliL the 1970s external economic
conditsas,'givbn''1Japanesep[annerstook
aLmost for granted ever-expanding  overseas markets, a continued supply of
raw materiais, inctuding enecgy/ and fixed exchange rates' Before the end
of the 1960s the balance of payments constraint had aIt but disappeared-
The stabLe wortd of fixed exchange rates came to an end in  1971, however,
-and in  1973 oil  ceased 'to be an inexpensive  source of energy. The drive to
proar." an increasing range of mone sphisticated goods uas accentuated.
Lxter:nat[y, pressure mounted as Japanrs exports continued to expand to US
and Europe, themseIves facing simitar probIems-
Taking the 1970s as a,who[e, Japan again achieved a remarkabte  success.
After the first  oiI  shockrthe  increased oit  bitL was met through higher ex-
oorts bv 1975; the recovery after the second wave 9f increases  bras even more
rapid. inftation remained generail.y tow (despite a sharp rise in 1973-7lr)and
cer.tainLy lower than in most of Japanrs industriat competitors.  Japan continued
'to make a steady progress in upgrad'ing its  indust?Y, the main sectors of ad-
vance being carsr'rur..rr  and opticaL goods, radios and. TV products, watchgsl
and a widening trng" of products incorporatinE  e[ebtron,ic components. By the
end of the 1970s.lapan's industry had managed to improve its  product competitivity
vis-i-vis  European industry in a series of major sectors and to move abray
from those where it  was in danger of [osing ground to the neuLy-industrialised
countries,(1)
A genera[ point which may bb emphasised is that Japanese exports, at teast
up to the 1970s, were cleveLoped essentiatLy'in order to finance necessary
suppties;.the gr-owing internatiohaLisation  of the Japanese economy is a retative-
[y receni phenomenon] fn" growth of the Japanese economy has been based overatt
on the devetopment of the internaI market, atthough export-ted growth has
occurred at certain times (e.g. in 1980).
As regards the question of productivity, it  is in those sectors which
participate strongty in wor[d tr.d"  that productivity is high and exceeds the
EC LeveL. There aie'considerabIe  variations even'within such sectors, however,
notabLy between the Leve[s achieved by the big firms and those attained by
;;;tL-'"nJ r"airm-sized compdnies associated with thetn, which makes straight-
iorward _comparisons difficuLt.  The position as.regards productivity in Japan
is deatt with more.fuL[y in a speciat section in t]re Annex (Annex, Section 4)'
For IEffiA- examina.tion see "C es in IndustriaL Structure in  thc
European Economies s
'l
aI AnaLYsis
particuLar tne rapiJ Abandonment of its  specialisation in products with [ow-
ski L t ed tabour ani ptris,i caI capitaI content. In 1963 Japan h,as sti t L at
:f;;-i;";t-;i  *re-rlast-advanced EEc countries whereas by 1977 it.had causht
up with the usA and the Federa[ Republ.ic of Germany" (at p.43), "The retative
dependence of the community on to91 skiLled Labour/capital content has
accentuated  and is now hig-her than that of Japan and the usA"(idem).-t-
The position achieved by Japan by the end of tne 1970s is summarised
betow in terms of three main asoects:
(a) Japanfs overatt economic devetopment  and changes in industriaL
st ructure;
(b) Japanrs export growth in relation to the gronth of wortd exports;
eAt*" (c) euarF in the composition of Japanrs exports and imports (by product
and geographicaI area).
In a further section Japanrs export and jmport structure is compared
with that of the European community and of the united states.
t]
(a) iapanrs economic deveLopment  and chanbes in industriaI structure,
The fottowing taUt"s set out the gnowth in Japan's GDP, industriaL
production and in totat exports and imports.
(1) 1975 was a recession year folLowing the oiL crisis.
Source: 0ECD and Ministry of Finance, Japart
(1) Estimate based on first  three quarters at annuat nate.
Source : Ministry of Finance,  Japan
In view of the substantiaL rise in ebp and the size of the.tJpjneii
economy, it  is necessary to [ook at the evotution in particular sectors
in  order to see llhat changes occurred within the overatt devetopment  and
to trace the part pLayed'by. externaI trade-, in individuat areas. As thc tabLes
above show, gLobaL exponts and imports, have foLtored a cLosety parattel
coursd, both in growth rates and as a percentage of GDP. The next set of
tabtes show production grorth in major industriat branches and the cxtent
to which production has been concentrated on the domestic market or has beeh
exported in these areas.
As regards the effect of exchange rates and comparative prices on Japanrs externa
trade, see the account givcn in the Annex, Section 3.
Average annuat
;rowth rate
1955-6A 196{'l-.70 1970"74 1975 (1> 1976-80
GDP (reat
terms) 8.6 % 11.0 % 7"?',l 1.4 'A 5.1 7,
Industria[.
Product i on
(reat tirms)
16.4 % 14.6 ',A 6.9 Z -11 7, 7.3 Z
Exports of
goods
(current prices)
15.1 % 17.7  % 14.1 '/, 0.4 % 18.6 %
Import s. of
goods
(current pri ces)
35.0 'l 16.5 ',l 34.8  % -  77! 19.7 Z
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 (1)
Vatue of GNP (bn. Yen)
(current prices
5,883 81142 15,214 31,787 70,731 148,798 242,800
Exports as Z
of GNP
7.8 r( 8.9 % 9.6 Z 9.6 7. 9.8',l .11 'l 12.1 'l
Imports as Z
of GNP
12.4% 10.9  % 10.6 % 9.2 7t 9.6 % 11.5 'l 13.? it-8-
in Productiort in Retati Domestic aOC
it  Penetration S,  1fl s
Iron and Steet
18.2313E.07
g4.L lzg.s
15.6 l?6.7
1.8 I o.z
Production (t bn.) 0.61 | 1.8',! |'4.59
Domestic share (z) | aa.z I as'z lrt's
Export share (z)  | rr.a lra.r I t't
Share of imPorts in I  I
domestic consumP- | n.a. I o'4 | 2'1
tion (Z)
Texti tes
Production (8 bn.)
Domestic share (I)
Exports share (I)
Share of imPorts in
domestic consump-
tion (I)
1.49 I 3.19 14.85129.08
76.? | 76.5
26.8 | 23.5 ?3,5 120.6 14.9 111 .?
rt.?. I t.o
5.21 lO.ee
?6.5 I7g.a
Production (S bn.)
Domestic share (I)
Export share (X)
Share of irnports in
donestic consump-
tion (I)
0.34 11.02 13.6E lz'r  l2o'21
n.". I 88.3'laa-s las-t 183'o
n.". | 11.7 111.? lto.l 117'o
n.a. | 2.5 I 2-6 l e.s l2'4
I ac and oartS nc. notorcyctes
u I  HnlGll  'rwrv'  "
Production (6 bn')
Doncstic share (1)
I export share (I)
I
I sha.e of inports in
I  donestic conlumP-
I  tion (I)
o.1o | 0.53
n.a. 
| 
96.+
n... 
I 
3.6
n.". I 2.7
2.39
95.5
4.5
0.6
lr.,o
lgt.z
I 
r''
i 
o''
'a5.19
87.8
12.2
0.4
35.43
77.1
22.9
I o.'9 [;'il
l'1
ffir.  f igures for donesti: ",ld;:lport 
shares shorr'the division 9f Japanese production
'"  brir""i th... in percentage terns'  s eaLculated as inports divided by
(z) The share ot'imports in aondrii.-ronrurotion  is eaLculated as inports divided by
iproduct]g" niri"lil..ltFSl'f;lt".iaLs are excLuded-rrom  9y:.1:^:"d 
inrport fisures''
(3) In "TextiLes"e l:xrr::-:.::--::.';;";  the Census of llanufacturers  * jt3::-1:';,'il;:
(4) sources. prodrction.fisure:-:;;  from the. c"nsul-ot ranufacturgr;-<iiio-rq78-edition)'
Erport and import figures-...'i.o"'in" rnit" ".oir 
ol ini"rn"t-ionat rrade u9s1'
19g0 editions), both issued ort'[![1]'b=t;i;tti;';[u-es are at current prices'shi
hemi cb I
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Passenger cars
(in votune)
1 950 1 955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1979
1,000 units
Domestic shaie'(Z)
Export share (X)
Share of imports in
donrest i c consunp-
tion (1)
n,a. n" a. 165
91.6
8.4
2.3
696
83.0
1?.0
?.2
3rl E(
77.2
22.8
0.E
4r57O
60.0
40.0
1.7
51430
45.5
54.5
1.7
6r48(
47.E
52.2
?.1
s
Production (8 bn.)
Domestic share (Z)
Export share (X)
Share of inports in
domestic consump-
tion (Z)
0.13
87.7
12.3
12.5
0.31
74.9
25.1
1.5
0.85
66.1
33.9
4.9
1.34
44.3
55.7
6.6
3.21
56.1
43,9
3.3
9.58
37.4
62.6
.2.4
13.?1
3E-5
61.5
?.5
Generat machinery
Production (8 bn.)
Domestic share (Z)
Export share (I)
Share of importi in
domestic consump-
tion (Z)
0.31
11. il .
I1" 3.
n. a.
0.85
88.6
11.4
10.9
3.35
93.4
.6.6
8.3
6.1E
89.9
10.1
7.5
89.4
10.6
7.O
89 18. 35.73
81.2
18.8
6.6
46.87
7E.5
21.5
5.6
79.3
?o.7
5.3
8r 71.
of uhich ltachine Too s
Production (8 bn')
Domestic share (7)
Export share (I)
Share of inrports in
domestic consump-
tion (1)
0.0014
n. a,
n. a.
n. a.
0.01 3
95"4
4.6  .
57.8
0.14
95.9
4.1
31.6
a.26
82.7
17.3
2?.4
1 .28
94.8
5;2
12.?
1.30
84.0
1 6.0
6.2
1 .85
76.6
23.4
3.9
emicbIs
Production (8 bn')
Domestic  share (f,)
Export share (X)
Share of imports in
domestic con-
sumption (Z)
p.84
Ps. 
a
1.8
[''
2.05
95.4
4.6
5.4
4.05
95.8
4.2
6"4
7.69
9?.9
7.1
5.4
15.39
92,o
8.0
6.6
t5.14
88.9
11.1
6.?
46.25
90.7
9.3
6.7
.98 t8
91.2
8.8
7.6-10-
Etectronics : CoLour TV receivers
Production (S bn.)
Domestic share (I)
Exports share (1),
Share of imports in
domestic consumP-
tion (Z)
1. a,
1. a.
'1.3.
1.60
90.0
10.0
2.1t1
23.6
26.4
n.a.
3.27
7A.3
29.7
0.0
3.E2
75.9
24.1
0.2
Of the sectors covered above, onty texti tes and, to a tesser extent,
iron and steeL, shou a significant 9!gg in. the percentage  ol.Japanese
f;dffi;ffioted  to exports. In Tfie-othir sectors a steadity rising
xport percentage is to be observed, subject to netatively minor-T-luctuations, export percentage
ffiInthecaseofpassengercarsand.:!!gq/exportsrepresent over  Ine  ygars.  In  frlE  uc|st  ul  Pos5sllgEl  5:3  qrru ..r.Pa,  sAPv. sr  .Lr.v-r"!
over 502 if  production (52X and 612 respecffity, in tte latest years covered).
The export share in the case of co[Our TV receivers, machinq,ieqlg  and [angpgl!
equipment is in the region of 24'25fl-
The upuard trend as regards exports has been accompanied by very
substantjai increases in the value of annuaL production, rith the period
1970-1975 marking in most cases the beginning of very big rises in production
va I ue.
Imports, even where they have increased in retative terns, have
remaiffi-a-Tery tow share of Japanese domestic consumption. 0f the
covered, onty ttrFfiTa[6-5t the present time has anything approaching
significant imFai|[] aif'even here imports have rareLy kept pace rith
sectors
a
an
exfanding  Japanese market. In other cases, most strikingLy n?chine to9[s too Is,
(b)
the narket share hel.d by imporls has decreased. Textite impoiti have risen
sjnce 1gZO, but overatL in this sector, as in othffire  Japan has reduced
its retative export effort, Japanese industry has continued to hoLd its
home market.
As shoyn in the tabLe beLow, Japan increased its share of vorld
exports rapidly betyeen 1948 (0.5tr) and 1958 (3U - a sixfoLd increase),
and again up unti t  1970, by nhich time Japan's share had nore than doubled
again to reach 7.2},. Between 1970 and 1980 there u,as a further lncreasel
Jlpanrs share of uorld exports renraining over 7X despite the greater part
taien by oil in uortd trade, yhil"e the share of the EC and the US declined
overaLL. In 1979, houever, Japanrs retative share feLI from 9.27 to 7.8I;
the preceding yen appreciation contributed to this, together rith a gener
po1icy of expor't restraint ulhich was observed betueen [ate 1978 and autUmn 1979.
The evplution of Japanese exports in various sectors (etectrical and
nOn-etectricaL machinelL motor vehictes, chemicq[sr iron ?nd .steet.and
textiLes), by compaFl$-JrITFEse  oiltre-Ef-ancl the US, is shorm in
ffin  s of the Annex.
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(c) Changes in composition of Japanese exports and imports by
oroduct and qeoqraphicat  area
' (i)  Changes in composition by-proddct
Japanese exports of industriat products have evotved as shovn
EAiou, ab,ay ffi'm Labour-intensive industries toyards knorLedge-
intensive products.
Source : E. hri tkinson "Changement de Structure des Exportations du Japon 1955-1976 :-;-  et ses Impticationi pour ta Communautd.Europ6enne",  Chroniques dractuatit6
de [a S.E.D.E.I.S., 15 avriL 1978, p.244; vhere detailed description is
'  given of iateEorles and method of catcutation.
(8 m. current price)
Cate-
80ry
Year
Desoriptlon of Catcgorlee
L95i Lg6o L965 197q L975 r976
I
VaIuo 929 1748 2433 40?8 7294 B34B
Category I:  Labotu lntanslve
industries (e.g. leather, -rood
and textile nanufacturers) f"
shore 53 53
t
31 21 14 r3
u
Value , 255 753 L969 5ye 18413 24LL6
Category II:  fnd,ustrieg tdth
above averagp lctowled,gr
lntenoity but belor avorags
intensity of capital
(e.g. carsr ahipel
electronice)
,1,
share 15 23 2' 3( 3t 38
III
VaIue 384 543 2004 43U L4627 Ln40 Category IIII  Capital lntenF
slve as well as energ; end,
rau naterial intensivc. '
(e.g. petroleun pmductst
fertilieersp iron and. steelt
aynthetic fibree)
d
t)
share 22 I6 ?6 24 2t 24
ry
Value r?C ' 281 r323 4L64 11999 l.5493 Category IV: Keowledge intetr-
sivc industriea (e.g. geoeral
nachinegyr Phaneceutlcals'
aircraft I t eleconruunicatl,oaot
conputora)
,ri, 
,
share 1C B 1? 23 2 25
Total
in4
cate-
goriel
Val-ue u3e 3y5 7729 1?887 523) 62697
,h
share ro0 I00 100 100 100 1@_15_
Japanese imports have been marked by a rise in the vatue of oiL imports since
ffiherwise  shown a broadly stabte pattern.
i  Composition of Japanese imports by sectors (SITC chapters)(cif vatue)
Source: l,linistry of Finance, Japan
Cat egory I 950 1955 1 960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Totat Va tue
(S bn)
2.4 2.5 4.5 8.1 1 8.8 57.7 8133.4
Food Va Iue
Z sha"re
0.6
25
0.6
25
2.52
11
1.4
17
2.48
13
8,36
14.3
tt 13.9
10.6/.
Beverages
& Tobacco
Va Iue
Z share
0.0?
0.8
0.01
0.4
0.02
0.5
0.05
0.5
0.09
0.6
0.4
o.7
I  0.7
0.6'l
Crude mater-
ia Is (except
f ue Is)
Va Iue
Z share
1.15
l+8
1.?
49
2.2
49
3.17
39;
6.59
35
11.5
20
I  21,4
16|l
Fuets
Va Iue
Z share
o.29
13
0.3
13
o.74.
16
1.6
20
3.9
21
25.6
44.4
I 70.0
5?.72
0i Is, fats,
uaxes
Va Iue
Z share
0.02
0.8
0.04
2
0.04
1
0.05
0.s
0,08
0.6
o.2
0.3
s 0.4
4.4'l
Chem'i ca t s
Vatue
Z share
0.07
3
0"08
3
0.26
6
0.4
5
1.0
5
2.O
3.5
I  6.?
4.7'A
filanuf actured
goods
Va Lue
Z share
0.06
0.3
0.06
0.2
4.32
7
0.55
7
1.87
10
3.64
6.5
I  .5.6
4.42
ftlach'ine ry &
T ranspor t
Eoui oment
Va tue
Z shaqe
0- 1i
8
0.13
6
0.40
I
0.71
9
?.13
11
3"8
7
I  9.8
77"
fili sce [ [aneous
manuf a.ctures
Vatue
Z share
0.02
0.8
0.03
1.2
0.06
1
0.16
2
0.6
3
1..99
3
I  4.5
3/.
0thers
Va tue
% share
0.007 0.02 0.09
0.6
4.2
4.4
g  0.5
0.4%-  14-
(ii)  Japanrs tra.de by area
Exports (Y. distribut jon)
1 955 1 960 1965 1970 't975 1 980
Deve Ioped a rq,a
Canada
US
43.4 47.4
7.9'
27.2
50.9
2.5
29,.3.
54.0
2.9
34.7
42,0
2.0
20.0
47.1
1.9
?4.2
l'restern Europe
EC (9)
E FTA
0t he rs
0cean i arS. Af ri ea
11 6
7.3
1.9
5.5
1Z v
8.6
1.8
6.0
r) U
9.3
2.E
5.3
l.+ o
10.2
?"6
1.8
5.4
12.8
?.4
1.4
4.h
DeveLoping araa
SE Asia
MiddLe East
Latin America
Afri ca
0t he rs
47.8 50.7
32.2
4,4
7..5
6.2
0.4
43.4
25.9
4.2
5. &.
7"1
0.4
40.5
25.4
3.3
6.1
' 5.2
0.5
49.6
22.5
10.9
8.5
7.3
0.4
45.8
23.8
11 .0
6.9
3.8
0.3
Commun'i gt . area __=_:-_l-
L n't na
USSR
East Eurooe
8.? 1.9
0.06
1.5
0.09
5.6
2.9
2.0
0.7
5.4
2.9
1.8
0.6
8.4
4.0
?.9
0.4
7.1
3.9
?.'l
0,6
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Imports (t( di str.ibution)
',955
1 960 1965 '1970 1975 19E0
Devetoped area
Canada
US
47.5 57.5
4.5
34.6
51.3
4.4
28.9
55.2
4.9
29.4
t+1.3
4,3
20.0
34.9
3.4
17.4
t'lestern Europe
Ec (9)
EFTA
0thet's
0ceaniarS,Afri  ca
8.8
6.E
o,7
9.6
8.9
6.7
'0.4
8.9
10.4
7.9 .
0.6
10.5
't.6
5.8
'1 .3
0.5
9.4
't.4
5.6
1.4
0.4
6.7
Devetoping area
SE Asia
Middl.e East
Latin America
Af ri ca
0the rs
48"7 39.8
?0.3
10.0
7,8
a:,
4?.3
17,2
13.6
8.6
2.3
0.6
,4o'1
15.9
12.4
7.3
3.7
0.8
53.s
18.3
28.5
4.4
1.9
0.4
60.4
2?.6
31.7
4.A
1.5
0.6
Communist area -TFila -
USSR
East Europe
3.6 2.7
0.5
2 .0.
0.2
6.4
2.8
3"0
0.6
4.7
1.4
2.6
o.7
5.2
2.6
2.0
0.6
4.8
3.1
1.3
0.?
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ttlinistry of F'inance,  Japan
?(d) Japanrs import ancl export.structure by-comparison with that of
EFE-ECopean  Commudrity and the united states
- 15 -
Import s
Sources :  EC E0rostat; US DePartment
Finance. EC figures are for
on estimates for 1980"
I
In the case of expoits, there has been a steady increase in the
re[ative importance oT-tre gg. The.increase to the l'lidd[e Eqs! has been
miriea : theie uas'a more tETn three-foLd increase oGfTfrI:lITt decade
(from 3.3/, (970) to 112 (1980)). Japanrs dependence on S.E. Asia as
a market has shown a retative decLine"
.  As regards impor.ts, the FC share has decLined from 7.9X in 197O to
5.67. in 1980 (eC-6?-t-ine). TEE share of imports from the US has atso
f itten. The major increase has been imports f rom the ttliddle East (oi l')
and, to a tesser extent, from S.E.- Asia and China. So far as imports'of
r""if".a"."i-"""at""i"  lon."rned, S.E. Asia's share rose from TOfT?r TtrO
# ffiUSsharefe|.Lfrom4o1to331t,hitetheECshare
dectined tron 251 to ?17..
of Commercel JaPan, filinistrY of
extra EC trade of EC of nine.  Based
lilanufactured Goods (1980) Per caoita As Z of totat imports
EC
US
J apan
d toa un
5  130 bn
I  30bn
I  627
$ 588
g 260
43.E /.
51.8 I
21.6 7,
Rar materiats, foodstuffs,
energy
Per capi ta As Z of total imports
EC
us
J aoan
s
I
8
198 bn (energy S 120 bn)
114bn(  "  S 82bn)
107bn(  "  S 68bn)
s 892 (S 541)
I  516 (g 370)
s 925 <8 592'
53.1 Z G2 7,'
45.6 Z $2.6 2>
76.7 7! G1 ]D
Export s
Manufactured Goods (1980) Per capita As Z of total exPorts
EC
US
J apan
I  249 bn
$  143 bn
I  120 bn
8'956
I  645
I  | "431
81'.6
66.8
92.6
z
x
/.
Rax materiaIs, foods0uffs,
ene rqy
Per capita As I of total exports
EC
US
J apan
I  48bn
S  61bn
S  3bn
I  187
g 277
s29
15.9 7.
28.7 /"
?.6 t,. r,
As regards exports,
of manufactured goods.
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aiL three areas concentrate on the export
ALthough the US and EC export raFmateriaLs,
'  ..t..
further information. of the comparative
us.
imports and manufactured iriports to one another
foodstuffs and energy, the amount is much Less than that of exports of
manufattured  products (considerably  Less than ha[f even in the case of
the United States, and a fifth  in the case of the EC),
So far as import: of raw materials, foodstuffs and energy, are
concerned,  ttre Eiliiffi'n co  i tar
position in per capita terms: relative import tevets are virtuaLLy the
same. In the case of imports of manufactured products, horever, the
differences are 'striki  res are very Lor
in absotute terms, and not merely in reLation to othen imports (1).
The resutt js that, in the .case of the EC, an ,increase in irnports
of manufactures has added. to the overatt trade deficit,  uhi [e Japants
trade deficit  is reLativeLy smalter since its  imports of manufbctured
products have remained at a [oH [eve[.  The consequences  of this trend,
t.lhi ch has tended to become more pronounced over the past decade, are
evidentLy of major significance  .  .
Looking at the matter in terms of char{ges in domestic  demand in
Japan, the position may be broadty summarised as fotLors: uhen Japanese
domestic demand rises, the absoLute increase in manufactured imports
remains Low in reLalion to Japanese output and rorLd trade in nanufactures
general.ty; when domestic  demand fal.ts on the other hand, the corresponding
increases in Japanese exports of manufactures are nuch higher. It  is
essentiaLLy Japanese imports of fueLs and rau naterials that change rith
domestic  demand.
(1) The fot LoHing tn! '.es give
position of Japan, EC and the
2.  Shares of total
and to GDP.
1.  Shares of totaI exports and manufactured exports to one another
and to GDP.
Totat exports/GDP Manufactured exports/
totaI exports
Flanuf actured exports/
GDP
J apan
EC
US
102
'l1it
8t
972
852  '
v1'l
9.9X
9.52
5.4X,
Itlanufactured  i mports/
totaL imports
117,
137.
9Z
Source: Eurostat, Data refers to 1979. EC of 9; intra-EC trade exctudedl"-
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?.  .Japan's Indystrial_and  lommerciat $tructure
The preceding section sets out the resutts uhich Japan has
achieved to date in niajor branche:; of iis  economy and the externat
trade component. A principaI part of.the exptanat'ion of hov it  proved
possibLe for Japan to carry through thjs devetopmentn  is to be found in
iapants distinctive industrial. and commerciaI structure. It  is this
structure which, in conjunction hrith officiaI  poLicies and the r6le of
the administrationr' shapes much of Japanrs economjc behaviour and gives
Japanese industry iher resjLience and capacity to imptement  sectoraL  changes
that are such marked features'
The speciaL cha..'acteristics  of this structure are:
(a) The existance or a Limited nymber of groupings of major firms.  The
members of these groups are Loosety Linked together but aHare of a certain
f ami l-y reLationship;
(b) A very targe number of small and medium-sized companies'vh'ich do not
normaLty have the strength to vithstand competition on their orn and vhich
therefore seek affi Iiation with the Larger firms;
(c) The creation of bonds between the major'fiims and smatt and medium-sized
business such that a set of cIose ret,ationships  is created-
The advantages of the resuLting structure is that the targe firms can
prov'ide the drive in instituting neu deveLopments  and in securing economies
of scaLe in proclrci i6n, uh'i Le the sma[ |' f i rms e!"tabLe changes 'in production
to be marle rapi dty and '*'ith [ower overheads"
.  The irr.terconnectjon  betueen Japanese firms means that a foreign
suppl'ier who seeks to enter the Japanese market finds hinsetf not mereLy
compet'ing djr*ectLy with Japanese Companies making-simjIar products, but
"ng;g"a in un effbrt to deal- w'ith the. netHork r:f firms invo[ved; to an
.rI.it  not eas'ity parat leL led eLseuhere, 'it is the system or structure
itseLf in the partict.tt;:r sector which uiIl  determine whether the import
penetration  becomes ifective. Japanese industry js thus, in its  structure
and the 91ay'it operates, resistent to imports of goods.atready  nanufactured
in Japanj etthough tariff  barriers are noH retativeLy lor  (uith some sig-
nificant exceptjJns), this has had L'ittle effect in practice on the market
share of imports of manufactured products
(a) The,tB.lg_By:l-ness  Groupg.  Looked at in terms of company size,
the Japanese economJi-structr.rre is divided between a reLativeLy smatL
number of Large firms on the one hand and numerous smalL and mediun-sized
enterprises on the other (1).  Altii':uEh the smaLI and medium-sized  firms
'  "  "1"
(1)  The accoLrnt gir.ren in this section is ba.sed l-ergeLy-on the size and
nature of Japaneru fi.*."  It  is aLso possib'Le to describe Japanrs industriaL
"ii-."Ar"rciat 
structure in terms cf rnajor' area of concentration.  Thus one
neIt-known commentator has distinguished between four nrain branches:
1.  Heavy industry. steel, chemicatsn al.uminir.lm, ships, synthetic
fibres.  l'hese arr nrarked by overcapacity'
2.  Agricutture, reta'iL arrd shoLesaLe distributorsr. .991?n.L industries
(texti tui,  aVlng, cutlery).  These const'itite "poIitjcaL rilt"ds"'
3.  FubLi.c 'rr.,iporationr. NTT, rai [wa;'s. These have been in a monopoLy-
tike pos'ition"
4.  ilodern fianufactures. Carsn eLectronics, fine chemicats' Jaean i-9
extremeLy competjt'i ve in these sectors.
In considering the question of increasing exports to Japan, the
matter may accord'ingly  be viered in the [ight of this breakdovn as reLL
as that given in the text.  J" Abeggten and T. Houtr "Facing up to. the
trade gap Hith Japan", folg;gn "Affgirs, voL. 57r no' 1, FaLL 1978t p. 146.-18-
play'an important part as'supptiers for big business, as exptained
further be[ow, it  is the big business firms that shape and provide
-the main driving force of the Japanese economy. It  has been said
that, though einptoying tess than one-fifth of the tabour force, these
firms accgunt for about haLf of the industrial added vaLue (1).  It
is notably in the Large companies that the system of tife-tern enploynent,
is practised and where hraggs increase uith seniority, thus encouraging
company toyaLty and a positive approach to changes in Horking practices.
These Iifetime empLoyees are recruited fron among the best university
graduates and most highLy-skitted  vorkers.
But these factors are not sufficient to exptain uhy a comparativety
smatI number of companies is abLe to be the principal driving force of
the economy.  These firms are abte to do so because of tvo structurat
phenomena yhich have their common root in the inherent Japanese'preference
for group action, name'ty
-  the existence of a Limited number of compet'ing big.bus'iness groupe;and
- affi[iations  betreen individuat big business and smalI firms.
There are Less than a dozen of these major groups. The composition
of the group and the retative importance of the firms vithin it  vary fron
case to case, but a standard group includes a feading bank (city bank),
a general. trading house (sogo phosha) and a number of najor.companies
from key industries (2).  The group maintain their solidarity by giving
preference to deal.ings Hithin the group and by shorling cohesion  rrhen
expanding activities or when facing outside competition. The teaders of
the companieS trithin the group meet together, exchange information  and
are avaiLable to heLp settLe any disputes that arise.  It  voutd neverthetess be
exaggerated to assert that these groups function as centraLty-controIted
concerns; the sheer size of the firms has rnade the exercise of centrat
djrection as such impossibte (3) 
.r1..
(1) lrlr. L, de Guiringaud2 "Eurs-Japanese  Symposium - Trad€r Finance and
Poli.tics in the 1980s"' 3 and 4 llay 1979, Speakersr Papers, at p- 70-
(2) The sjx main congLomerates are ltlitsubishi, ltlitsui, Sumitomo,  Fuyo,
Sanua, Dai-Ichi Kangyo.  The Fuyo Group inctudes, for instance, besides
the Fuji Bank (one of the langest in the vorLd)r'llarubeni Trading Corporation
(major trading company or "sogo shoshal', the Yasuda financiaL group, Nippon
Kokan, Canon (cameras, etc.), 0ki ELectric (communications equipment),
Keihin and Tobu Raitways, as uett as the more'independent  Nissan filotors and
Hitachi (eLectronics),  uhich aIso form giant corporate groups of,their oun.
The tttitsui Group is  Linked to flitsui  & Co. (sogo shosha), ltitsui Bank,
Toray Industries (texti Les), t.tlitsui Engineering and Shipbui tding, Toshiba
and, to a lesser extent, Toyota ljlotors.
The totaL number of companies invo[ved in the major groupsr through
the estabtjshment of separate firms in different sectors, is approximate[y
2.OOO, uith a core group of about 11000.
(3) A steering r6Le was performed by the general trading companies in the
case of the pre-war congLomerates  ("Zaibatsu"), but the relative porer of
the trading.houses uithin the groups has dectined vith the expansion of
manufacturing indust ry.-19-
Because of the Loy equity levets under yhich Japanese conpanies
operate, the banks yithin the groups have been in a key position.
Atthough the banksf r6te as a provider of relativety tou-cost funds has
been oi cruciaL 'importance,  they have not assumed a connanding position
nithin the groups (1).  The distribution of debts and cross-Liabitities
11ithin the group has nevertheLess reduced the comnerciaI risks invoLved.
The groups, and the companies uithin them, are engaged in cLose
competition, both on the Japanese market and on third markets.  Each
major group seeks to gain a foothold and then'to increase its share
in aLL the gr.owth sectors. In the case of ovqrseas activities, the
trading comfanies ptay a major part in cottecting information (together
sith JETRQ),  enabLing them to provide probabty the most exte.nsive
cottection of.orr".ij"t  data in the rortd, in purchasing rar materiats,
and in exporting Japanese manufactures (2).  In this instance a[so, there
is a specjatisation of funct'ion yithin the oVeraLL framevork.
(1)  The suppLy of finance for Japanese firms is a further important
aspect in assessing the operation of Japanese industry. The Japanese
capitaI market itsetf  is reLativeLy  smatL in proportion to the size of
the economy. The governmentrs "tax take" is tikevise smatt by EurOpean
and US standards (Japants overaIt tax burden in terms of GDP vas 18.12
in 1978, compared vith 30.81 in the UK' 51 '6I  in the FRG, 35I in France
and 26.5% in the US; source: 0ECD Revenue Statistics 1965-1979>.  This
is counterbalanced,  however, by a vqry high tevel of savjngs (202 of
d1sposabte househotd income), tthich are paid into the banks. In recent
years there has atso been a high leveI of government  indebtedness, covered
ihrough the jssue of bonds wh.ich have been taken up through the banks.
Large Japanese firms procure their funds very Largety from comnerciaI
banks "nJ, 
to a lesser extent, from t'rading houses. SmaIt and mediun-sized
businesses  uhic'h are affiLiated to Large companies are often suppor:ted by
credits from these firms, or from trading houses and vholesaLers, uho have
extensive know[edge of the firmts financiaL condition. In practice both
large and smal-[ firms are ab[e'to pursue a grouth-oriented investment
patiern even. jf  th6ir net-rrorth ratio declines to a Levet vhich in Europe
or the US rouLd be considered dangerousty Lor.  An 85:15 debt/equity
ratio.is  not uncommon. Through a combination of causes (the position of
the company within the group, the degree of capi"taL indebtedness to others,
notabty the banks, the importance of the sense of obl-igation oved to the
empt.oyees), the risutt  arrived'at is:  an "economic phenomenon  un'ique to
;apani priiate firms are rarely put up for sald on the market"2 Y. Nakagaua
and N. gta "The Japanesd-styLe  Economic System: A neu batance betueen
intervention and freedom", Foreign Press center, Japan 1981,
The commerciaL banks in turn are subject to carefuI offjciaI  guidance
from the centriL bank, The Bank of Japan operates a system rhereby it  sets
quarterty ceiting for the Loan prognammes of the commerciaL  banks ("vindov
guidance;') as a iupptement to the,normat controLs (reserve requirements,
discount rate changes, etc.) operated by centraL banks.
(2)  The njne major trading companies are responsibLe  for over 702 of totat
imponts (especiaLty of ra'w materials and buLk goods) and 50I of exports.-20-
(b)  Verticat Affi tiations and the 16 te of Srna L L and Fledium-si zed Ent e rpr i ses (SlrlE
l{ith the Tgi9..'grgup.rngs  occupy,ing,  so to speak, the high ground, the other four-fifths of ihe-Japanuse la6our forse are enployed by more than 600,000 smatI or medium-sized firms citose empr.oying ress than 11000 peopLe (1)-  The productivity of 4," sr,ri-is [ess than 702 of that of the companies uith more than.1,ir9g 9rni"i;;r; they pay snatler yages and offer tess sociaI security facititi"!  i"-inl;r  staff than big compan.ies; Iife-time employment is ret"iiu"iy-ii.  .r..ption and side benefits are rare.
BroadLy StrlE may be cLassified in three'groups: (a) those yhich act as adjuncts or sub-contractors.of  r.qrg., ,orpJnigs te.g, in the car industrv); (b) those engaged nrore indJp"nurnili in artisanal. activities (e'9.' in the cuttery induitry); and (c)'those in ttre distribution sector.
rt is in the case of the first  and, to a considerabte extent, the third group2 that the phenomenon of affiiiiii""-ietHeen.big and smatI firms, rhich is a distinctive featufg of ,.tapanese industriit.rtrr.trr", is most marked. This system of affitiatioi-ifiorn 
", 
,,Keiretsu,,) is as teast as important for the functioning or tr,.tJ"iun"r" economy as the exi stence of the m.a jor groups" r,thereis not aI L ieading  manuf acturing or trading companies beLong to big busines, g.orprr-it cai sareri ue assumed that aIl major Japanese manufactuiersr-irauing  houses'and uanrs, uithout exceptionr.have a targe number of smalI and medium companies underr their "umbretta".. reiretsu affir"iation, 
"iist  in relation to the production activities of teading rnanuraciurJ", o," trading houses, as Heil as on the distribution side (z).  rn irre distribution chain furthermore domestic vholesaters above a certain size tenJ;;;t;; 
" simi Lar 16[e vis-a-vis smat[er vhotesar.eri 
"no ."trrters.
.  Japanese company affitiation, unIike European-or US-sty1e verticat integration, is not normatty easiLy discern"ur.-u"."use there is rarety
?nv shgleloLding of significant size by the bigger company in the,snatter one. At first  gtance therefore, it  looks as ii".o*p"ny affiLiations constitute nothing but sub-contiactor or suppfi .rlurv"'. ;;i;i;;;-bdtreen independent enterprises. This is nornail.y not the case" As regards manufacturing,  very fev medium-sized compinies in .lapan speciar.ising in particutar fiel'ds have reached a status that a[tous them to be independent supptiers to morq than one teading enterprise.  The nornar. rer.ationship betueen. a Leading manuf acturer anJ its smaI L/mediurn-si zed sufpl.ier or deater is that the smar"I and medium company works exctusivety for the group-teading manufacturer.  Based on tirls, ttre t'bading manuiacturer is, in its orn interest; concerned about.productivity  and quality in the cornpanies aff i Liated to it.  The Leading company'quite  of t.en nefps'ttrere_ fore to finance technicaI innovations, ;il  ;;;'sJppties the r..i,inu.y, trains staff, and provide's business credit, to "-ril-ioit.".ai'"n"i*pany.
(1) silE r{ith less than 300 emptoyees represent 99.5r of aLL firms and emptoy 75,2N of atI  empLoyees
(2) Since these keiretsu r.inks nornar.r.y take the form of a nutti-tier system (i.e.  one subsidi.ary sub-contracting  rork, yhifh again i,  ,ru_ contracted etc-) the countfng of kei retsu-[ inted'conpanies is difficut t. Judging from the nateriaI avaiLable, a company Like Nippon steet, rhich doesnothaveanyapparentconnection.witn'uuigb,'ffi,ni.in
fact about 2r000 conpanies that are direc,tIy or-tnairectty-kei."tr" nembers' rn the case of etectric equ'ipnent manufacturers Ii[e  iatsusrrita (brand name: Nat'ionat, Technics) or a car manufactr]rrr-iit"'iirffitr;i."
nunber might be even greater,-?1 '
In exchange for this, the keiretsu leaden ixpects from his sub-
contractor exact deLivery, qr.raLity and competitive pricing, and
even futI cooperation  up to acceptance of bankruptcy if  the teading
company is in an economic"squeeze" (1).  A recent exanpte xhere big
manufacturers shif.ted income losses, on to their sub-contractors  and
suppl.iers occurred in 1978, when the yen suddenly started to rise
against the doILar, and leading exporters had to squeeze production
costs in order to absorb foreign currency losses.
In this keiretsu ietation both sides profit.  The l.eading coopany
has a number o{ advantages by using sub-contfacting rather than in-house
production. These advantages .are : avoidance of rigidity connected uith
the Lifetime emptoyment system (StlE do not give guaranteed [ifetine
emptoyment); lover average Labour costs at the sub-contractor  leveLi
passing on of costs of stockhoLding of parts and goods and other cost-
cushioning functions; and greater etasticity in operation rates. In
one tondrsub-contractors  constitute a security beLt around the teading
company, nhich protect it  from the futI impact,.of changes in economic
circunstances and hel.p it  to surv'ive in competition uith other Leading
companies (2).
The advantage for the St{E on the-other hand, in the fierce[y
competitive  ctimate of Japan, uith Lirnited access to bank finance and
yith ner technology often onLy economicaLLy viabLe in a Larger tie-up, isthat
betonging to a keiretsu group gives the Sl{E security and the means to
advance. The sub-contractor  thus has an interest in the prosperity of
the group as a vhote and in the business  success of the teading company
in generaL. The smaLL and medium company, for its part, tries to further
sub-contract part of the business it  takes on, in order to provide itsel.f
yith simi [ar cushioning such as the Leading company has provided for
itsetf.  A muLti-tier system of sub-contractors, sub-sub-contractors,
etc., is thus a regutar feature,of a keiretsu.
tlhat is said above relates mainly to keiretsu groups Led by big
manufacturing compan'ies, and in particutar as regards the producti_on
side. Simitar keiretsu exist on the marketirrg side, though here ihe
situation varies from product to product area. In househo[d etectric
and etectronjc appLiances, for exampLe, 80I of the domestic distribution
is handLed by captive sales thr:ough rhoLesaLers  and retaiters, who deal
exclusivety w'ith a singLe brand product, e.g. Hitachi products voutd be
exctusivety sotd in Hitachi stores, Besides the manufacturers,  the
teading generat trading houses aIso have an exlensive netyork of
affitiated companies within Japan, not on[y in the distribution system,
- uhere as said ear[ier large domestic rhotesalers also forn keiretsu
of their oun - but quite a number of nhich are engaged in production.
The same is true as regards direct investment overseas. About 201 ot
Japan's manufacturing  investment abroad is done by the Large trading
houses.
..1..
by big business
hor strictty
(1) LegisLation exists forbidding defernent of payment
to sub-contractors.  There are grounds for doubting
this tegisl-ation is observed.
(2) It  is eStimated that in the car sector, for example, rhereas European
nanufacturers are responsibte for 50I dn average of the notor vehicLes
they producer,this figure is 40I to 20N in the case of Japanese auto-.
rnobiLe producers.  As a resutt the number of employees is considerabty
torer in Japanese car firms than in Europe or the US'-2?-
In order to avoid oversimpLification, it  may be mentioned
again that a considerabte  number of SttlE exist in some areas of tight
industries, in particuLar in artisanaI activities, rhich have no firn
affitiation directLy or indirect[y to a LeadinE company. These SttlE
are, houever, connected mainty through important regionaL vhotesaters
yith the distribution system. NevertheLess there is no doubt that in
this fiel.d the LeveL of organisatiot'r is much belor uhat is to be found
in other areas described above. The great number of"bankruptcies  recorded
each month is mainty to be found amongst these companies or the ones at
the Louer end of the sub-sub-contracting  chain of a keiretsu. These
companies are also the ones most tikely to suffer from competition of
LDCs and I'lICs since they competg dj rectLy rith their products-
There have been a number of governmentaL measures in the 1970s,
or envisaged for the 1980s, aimed at.raising the levet of SllE so as
to enabte them to keep pace yith the demands of the major companies,
as ueLL as to protect them from increases in vattle of the yen and he[p'
them to adapt to competition from neuty industr!aLised countries.
SpeciaI governnentaI mbasures have prov'ided a v ariety of incentives
(e.g. as regards financing, training and management, energy consumption,
improvement of emptoyee yeLfare). SectorS xhich have been particutarLy
aided are cut[ery, textiLes, siLk.and xooden products (1).  Export
expansion js a substantiat aspect of, such ptans, covering nev products
and markets (2).  There are indications that Japanese SllE export
operations"may  be LargeLy designed in terrns of devising an integrated
exchange vith neighbouring  NICs.
3.  Specif ic PoLi cies pursuqd during tfie-l!79s
So far as specific governmentaL poLicies and measures are concerned,
particutar attention may be cat l'ed to the fol Lowing:
(a) restructuring programmeg in industriaL sectors rheie
in the aftermath of the energY
crisis;
(b) efforts to further technotogicaL  deveLopment in the fiel-d
. of ',knourLedge intenffilflffiry  targe-scale
integrated circuits);  !
(c) energl progra,mme -and energy-saving measures'
(1)  See the 1978 Lau on Extraordinary  frleasures for Re[ief of Sma[t
and frledium Enterpri ses Af f ected by the Yen Appreci ati on.
(2)  See lilITI "Visions of. the SmatL and tlediurn Enterprises  and their
PoLicy Direction in the 1980s".(a) Structura L probLeos inrecession-hit seqtelr.  FoItouing the
1e73 ;irm@  shoutd be reduced
in a number of "structur€Lty depressed" iodustrjes: shipbui Lding,
atuminium refining, eLectric furnace steeL making, cotton and synthetic
fibres, and chemiiit tertiIisers.  The 1978 "LaH of Extraordinary  ltleasures
for the StabiLisation of Designated  Depressed Industries", jointLy
sponsored  by frlITI and the trlinistry of Transport, created machinery for
deciding the amount of capac'ity to be scrapp"d ll  each industry and for
financing the process. Industry advisory counciLs, composed of senior
members of tne industries  concerned and I4ITI and MOT officiaLs, hetp drau up
the scrapping programme, incLuding the attocation of cuts beth'een different
compani es.
The programme undertaken is surnmarised  betov:
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Indus t ry
Capac i ty
cut  ('/.,
Scrappir-rS
dead L'ine
Freezing period
unti I
Shi pbui Lding
Atuminium refining
E[ect.ric furnace
stee I
Nyton fi Iament
Potyester fi Lament
Cotton spinning
Ammoni a
Urea
55(1)
3Z
14
19
10
6
26
45
ilarch 1980
l,larch 1980
Itfarch 1979
January 1979
January 1979
October 1979
June'1979
June 1979
June 1983
June 1983
$ilarch 1981
f'larch 19El
March 1981'
June 1985
June 1983
June 1983
(1) Conceined the 60 nost inrportant firnrs'
In the shi pbui Ldi'ng sector, adrnini st rati ve guidance uas used to
l.imit the utiLisation of the remaining capacity of the 40 most important
ii;";.  This was repLaced by an anti-crisis carte[ of these firni after
1 August 1979.
The reduction of shipbuitding emptoymentl  rhich began even before
the adoption of tf,e f978 Lar, took the industryrs labour force back to
OiSt of its peak 19?4 teveL. 
'The reductions rere planned so as to protect
"tifetine" emptoyees so far as possibte. The use of pubLic subsidies on
a nide scate r"r 
"uoiabd, 
thoug't tn" industry vas aided by officiat credit
faciLities for neu orders
,.t..-24-
(b) Technotosicat  Devetopments. Japan regards the 1970s
as the per  hnoLogy caught up uith the uS
and Europe, except in some sophisticated fietds such as aircraft and
nuclear poter equipment. In terms of trade in technology, the totat
balance remains in deficit - the amount to be paid for inported knov-
hor, Licences, etc., outgeighs the value of-exports. So far as nev
contracts are conceined, horever, exports of Japanese techno[ogy^have.
exceeded imports each year since 1972. hJhereaS Japants objectit,G
eartier was to foLLoy a "buy and inrprbve" pattern vhereby foreign tech-
nology was acqui red and efforts concentrated on finding uays of
apptiing this'in [arge-scate production - a course nhich Japan pursued
yith- suicess - increasingly  Jap.an has sought to devetop its ovn technology
in ner areas.
The Japanese Government suppties about 3OX of R; and D. funds
(wjth a tendency for the percentage to rise), the remainder  coming fron
industry; the pioportion of direct support has-thus been considerabty
Less than is provided in most other industriaLised countries (1).
According to officiat pLans the current 1.77 ot'GNP rhich goes torards
R. and D. at present yltt  Ue increased to ?.51 by 19E5 and 3I bv 1990.(2)
It  is important to note the key r6Le pt.ayed by joint action on
the part of Government and industry. If  it  is true that Japanese firns
compete strongty on internal and vorLd markets, this does not appty to
the phase ytriitt- preceeds the production of high technology  goods''- It  is
the nornaI procedure that in strategic areasr and in acCordance vith
io.n-|".; targets, the responsibLe  got/ernment bodies and agencies join
nit[ ttre main industriat firms to conddct research through $haring the
efforts involved. It  was in this Hay that th.e probtens retating to the
deveLopment of micro-eIectronics uere tackted in 1972171. A similar
course occurred in 1980 yhen the formation of a "Biotechnology  Forum"
Has announced, comprising the five major Japanese firrns and IIITI'  A
i;;  ;;  un. tri0 t.'ecu) ig-vear progranrne ri[[  seek to devetop technotogies
in four areas : bioreactors, ceLi cuttivation, genetic engineering  and
celL fusion. The deveLopment of computer softlare has been fostered by
the activities of the Information Production  Association, in vhjch'
..1..
(1) The comparabld proportions are 502 in the case of France, UK and US
and 46X in the case of Germany. An account of J.apants R. and D. efforts
,outO-not be complete without emphasising the [arge number of quatified
Japanese personneL. (Data tron 19?51 Source; UN StatisticaI  Yearbook 1978.)
US J apan Germany France UK Ita ty Neth.
Scientists
engi nee rs
Techni c i ans
and 541 r10O
44,50O
399,84?-
901562
'1o31857
lOOr?76
65 1643
tr54r4E6
79r3OA
75r800
37,925
27,494
231750
30,540
(2) "Long-term.Prospects on SGience
'on Science and Techno[ogY, &ldy
and Technotogy", Advisory  Committee
1977.-25-
industry representatives, research uorkers and governnentaI official's
participate, as yetI as.through specific officiaL projects(1).
By these means the Japan Governdent and industry succeed in
using rel.ative[y smaLL amounts of money in order to deVetop products
rith a high net vatue:edded,  and vith a concentration on the industriat
appl.ication ahd manufacture of the product concerned.
The foLtouihg strategic areas have been the subject of Legistative
measures  designed io promote techno[og'icat devetoprnent: neH generation
'computers  and softbrare, semi-conductors,  opticaL.comnunications, Lasers,
medicaL eLectronics, industrial robots and nunericatty-controtted nachinery,
aircraft and nucl,eai engineering (2).  .Under the 197E ilachinery and
Information  Industry Promotion Lar, Devetopnent  Bank loans and various
tax advantages are avaitabLe,  as yetI as official.ty-guided joint deueLopnent
activities.
IndustriaL R. and D. programmes of nationat' inportance, reguiring
a h.igh teveL of funding and some degree of risk, have mostty been conducted
undei the aegis of the Agency of Industrial. Science'-and  Technology (AIST),
1{ITIrs agency for technoLogicaL affairs, rithin the frameuork of l{ationaI
Research and Devetopment Programmes (NRDP). The AIST takes the tead for
ptanning and financing the research project, nhiCh is then put out for
tender, the work itse[t being normalty carried out in one of AISTIg
16 insiitutes. Staff from the m-ajor firms frequentty take part in such
projects us.ing the faciLities of the officiaL institutes.  NRDP projects
now-in progreis incLude those on turbofan aircraft engines and manufacturing
appIication of Lasers. Projects on aIternative energy sources and energy-
saving technotogy deveLopment  have been carried out in AIST but outside lhe
NRDP framegork.
(c) Energy poLicy.  Japan, which reties on overseas sources for ,862
of its ei'FGiFFTo.reduce  the share of oit imports in energy consumption
from the present [eve[ of over 70:l to 65% in 1985 and 50X in 1990.,  A
considerabte  improvement has been achieved,since 1973 in energy use, as
measured by energy consumption per unit of GDP growth and per unit of
production in major industries. ln 1979, fotlowing the adoption of IEA
targets, the Government introduced neasures to reduce oiL consumption
..1..
(1) The officiat four-year VLSI devetopment project uas compteted, in
iq8O. A project Hhich started in npri t  1979 is aimed at devetoping
basic softuare for atJvanced computers and peripherat equipment' The
totaL budget is t  47 bn., half of chich wiL[ be provided by officiat
funds.
(?) As ."ga.d. future orientations, a "Long-tern Vision for Technological'
DeveLopment" is to be drawn up identifying priority goats.
The serni-governmentaL  Power Reactor and Nuclear FueI DeveLopment
Corporation,  estabIished under a 1967 Lax, is engaged ln developing
centrifugaL uranium.enrichment technotogy as re[[ as reactors and
equipment.-26-
by 3'A. The 1980 pi6grimme raises the target to 77,.' Per capita'oTl'
consumption is atready in fact retativeLy tow in Japan (1).
The Government  did not inpose tegisLative  controts on oit prices
and energy conservation  measures have been adopted through joint efforts
in the pubtic and private sectors, involving the industria[,  commerciaL
and transportatjon  sectors
A[ternative  energy sources are bding developed or investi6ated.
(i ) Nuc lear powe1, 14 power ptants are poyered by
capacity 15 mktrl 7 more are under ieactors_-(tota t'
construction and 7 are awaiting officiat  ctearance
and are tikely to operate in mid-1980s (further cap-
acity of 28 mku).
(ii.) CoaL.  Imponted coat
share of total energy  -
ConsiderabLe resources
coaI Liquefaction and
(ii i) llqurfled jaturat  gas.
to increase from 3Z to
is expected to increase its
from 1?% i,n 1977 to 17?( in 1995.
wi[t be devoted to devetoping
gasi f i cation technotogies.
The share of Ltl6 is expected
9fl in 1995.
(iv) Sotar grergy.  It  is estimated that 252 of aL['hones
viLI have solar rater heating by 1990"
A great deaL of Japants technology research effort is concentrated
in the energy fieLd, rhich receives ?Ol of pubLic R. and D. expenditure.
Projects such as magneto-hydrodynamic  porer generation,  nore efficient
gas turbines, fueL ceU.s and raste heat recovery systens are anongst the
areas being investigated.
(1) 3tonsayear
in the Federat
the UK.
in Japan, compared rith  nearly 9 tons in the US, 4.4 tons
Repubtic'of Gernany and just under 4 tons in France and-?7-  :
PART III,;  TfiE PERSFECTIVES FOR, THE 1980s
Atthough evidentty affected by officiat'actions, it  is jnrportant
to note thai the structure of Japanrs industry and commerce has not
resutted from the imposition of a'series of detaited ptans, devised and
imp[emented by the. pubLic authorities.  The pnocess of devetoping suitable
industriaL poLicies and securing their executiori has been a more comptex
one. t{hite itre'Japanese Government has at its disposaL an array of formal
poyers, simitar to those of other OECD countries, and uses the standard -."iS"-6t-t"ttOO" for determining the overaLI course of the economy,
guidance from the administrationeand an extensive series of consuliations
in order to achieve a consensus among the interested groups, have been the
usuat means emdtoyed to determine the course that'industry shoutd fot[ov.
Recourse by ltinisiriis, particul-arty tlITI, to "ad4inistrative guidance"
so as to inf[uence the conduct of private business, is a nornat part of
Japanese administratiop. It  consists, qn the 91e !and, of the fornutation
by the administration of official advice, as distinct fron the use of
direct porers of controt and interventiol, and, on the,otherr acceptance
by-private firms of the force of this adv'ice (1)..Adrninistrative guidance
haj been used extensivety in order to set up carte[s or to bring about
company mergers.uhere  these brere thought desirabte as part of the process
of promoting the growth of Japanese industry. The scope for adninist-rative
guida"nce in-the fitur.e ritl. pe affected in so far as rtapanese firrns devetop
a nore independent att'itude.
ConsuItation and consensus-buitding  amolg the nain participations i.s a
further principat eLement. By its nature and through. lhF tengthy procedures
invotved, this proces3 a.ims io create a ctimate in vhich att concerned
"g... 
on'objectives and their inptementation.  Recourse to legistation is thus
iire  Llkely to fo{tov th'is stage than to precede it,  and its function is.
often to provide the supportive franeuork rather than to institute direct.
;;;;;^;;"i"i  po*"iu oitllntpot in the area in quest"ion czl'
Japanrs .industriaL and commerciaL strategy. for the ]??Ot is not therefore
to be found in a singLe document or report vhich.Japan vi[[  proceed to execqte.
Lt i,s possible, however, by Looking at a number of authoritative studies, as is
done bLtor, to determine hou Japanrs industriat structure is I'ikety to'evotve,
at teast in tne years ifimedidteLy ahead. These reports, rhich vere mostty pre-
pared before the second oil. crisis, are the latest avaitabte.0n  being-contacted,
the institutions t.rno iiO these reports have a[[ maintained that, by and large,
the conctusions%rarn remain vaLid. Tro simpl.e observations endorse this vier.
Fir.st, Jbpanrs GNP growth hag so far not been too seriousty affected by the
,.ronl oil shock; thus performance is.stil't  more or tess in tine vith the
assurnptions undertying ihe forecasts. 
'second[y, 
med'lum-tern ori.entated investnent
actjvity designed io bring about structurat improvement, upgt"ading and energy
saving, lras strong in 19801 0 trend vhich, depending on private consunpti'on
deveLopnrent, is tikety'to'be  maint'aine-d this year.
The Occount given of these reports is divided into tvo sections,
the f;rst of yhicfi deats uith the genera[ contents of the forecasts and the
second nith Japan]s futtrre externat trade structure as this tppears fron thc .rCPOtttr
'  .../...
an officiat
not based
if  it  sere
(1) ExpLaining to foreigners  what administrative  guiclance meant,
of the ltinistry of Agric.ulture  onq€ pointed out that, though
on [ar, one uoutd be best advised to foll.or the'guidance  as
vritten tag.
(2) The systen used in the'restructuring  process in the late 1970s is a good
exanple here. See Part II,  P. ?3 abovel-28-
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1. Forecasts regarding overatI in{ustriaI structure
The foLtotrjng pages summarise the views and perspectives given :
(a) by the Industriat Structure Counci L (ISC), a principat : advisory organ of trtITI'(1), nhich subnits peiiodic'
reports; and
(b) by four teading Japanese private institutions.
The reports vary considerabt.y 'in thei r assumptions (nates of Gt{P
growth, oit prices, etc.) and in the ext-ent to rhich they give estimates
of groilth in particutar sectors or subsectors. The comnon vietr yhich
emerges from these reports, however, is that Japan wi Ll. make further
progress in a number.of machinery sectors, whiLe,re[ati:vely lor grorth 
I
vi[[ occur in prirnary industry and estabLished industries (texti[es, iron
and steet). this broad conctusion 696gs6.[s further points of interest in
tl"t-everi in sectors rrhich are viblred  as reLativeLy Lor-gro*th areas,
significant deveIopments  nay occur; (In the'case of chemicats, for exampte,
rhich-it.seemsgenera|'l.yagreedwittnotundergohighgrowth.(exceptas
regards exports), there wiLL be a considerabLe nove toyards production of
f ine chemjcaLs and pharmaceuticats.)
(a) lilITI Indgstriat Ftructure Counci t.  Common to atL editions of
the perib  cf naking Japanr.s industriat
structure'more  knowLedge-intensive  by raising unit va[u+added  in iiroduction- by the creation of more sophisticated goods ind services. Based on thjs ideal
the ISC report of t'lanbh 1980 entitled "A Visjon of IIIITI PoLiciee in the 19801,,
enphasizes the foLtowing seven points
(i)  research and development for technoLogicaI  innovation;
('ii)  the conservation of energy and naturaI resourcesi
(iii)  the development of tertiary industry (Z);
(iv)  the promotion of the machinery and information-based
industries as the Leaders in the years up to 1985;
' (v)  the partial retreat from industries uhere the deveLoping ,:
countries 1loLd- a retative, advantage;
(vi), tlre focat'ion overseas of resourceFconsuming  and tabour-
intensive industries;
(vii) emphasis on maintaining a high rate of empLoyment  (the Vision
'is based on the assumption that a grotrth rate of at teast'61
is .necessary in the medium term if  unemptoyment in Jipan is not
to increase).  r
ffiiscomposedofrepresentativesofindustrial.andbusineqs
, firms, labour and a number of independent members, as yelt as of llITI.
IIIITI provides the secretariat and prepares the drafts,of the reports.
(2) There is a considerabLe divergence of viev on the developnent of the tertiary
sector'The,NomuraResearchInstituteindicatesan.increaseintheshareof
tertiary industry from 56% to 59.5X betyeen, 1975 and 1984, The ISC rnticiprter
a'[evetIing-off of the share of the tertiary, sector. The i,litsubishi Research
Institute predicts an above average rate of growth for the tertirry  sector,
I-29-
^.-^ !itl-regard.to Japan'|s externat poLiciesr'the l9g0 Rcport assu,nes that rortd overatt.economic  grovth in thg.years up to rpCs-yiit-u" stightty" below the 4Z recorded in the 1970s, and. that, yhiie ttre average lio*tt  rate of the industriaLized nations wiLl. be onLy 3X (Japan anticipaies-for itsel.f a grorth of a Littte more than 5Z), that for the developing'nations *ii[=U,
compa'rativeLy  high (in pdrticuIarr' the Newl.y Industriaf iziig eouif.ies (NICs) and ASEAN nations).
The 1980 edition then states as an objective that:
"(1) In deal'ing uith industriatized nations, Japan needs to increase
imports of manufactured goods and the iro{uction of goods *ith
Larger added vatue, speciaLizing in sectois pith a  iomparative  , advantage 
't
(2) rn deating with the.newty industriar.izing'cg,r-r-rt[-Gsr.:hpan  qg_cds to encourage domestic industries to suitbh,ina;,ne, ities ot upgraded products.
(3) In deat'ing with devetoping:.ountries,  Japan needs to increase
and raw materials,,. (1) 
- -;---  7' "t''' '  Y'
A comprehensive structuraI forecast by the ISC was set out in the
1978 report, which gave a projection of the production struct;;* oi;;;
Japanese economy in 1985 (see Annexr,Tahle  6)
compared w'ith 1975, this shows a broad dectine in the share of pnimary
industries and a leveLting off in the case of tertjary industries,  ytrite
the secondary sector is expected tb'increase its  share. rhe biggelt increases in votume output so far as manufa.cturing industry is concernedrire  anticipated to take ptaqe 'in plgciiion,mpclilgll Q..sI average annuaL grouth rate),
genglal. mac!ingJy (7.8y.,, f abri:L!ud nletaI products (2.rf,), eLectricat
qachiner:t (7.?xr, chemicals (6.9x) 
"l@  aCjFtor  grouth
sectors are textilesfT.-m, iron aed sffiferrou!,Eetq1g  u1r.
.i
(1) l[  may be of- interest to note that the 1976 edition referred to the
horizontat d'ivision of labour on[y in the context of retations yith the
"middle advanced nations". 
t
"It  must be futty recognis'ed that externaI economic poticies shoutd
be c.arried out rith  the airrr of estabtishing interdependent retation-
ships wi'th other countries.". To assure trade interdependence it  hriL[
be necessary for Japbn to promote inports of goods froln advanced natigns, to organise the horizontaL'djvision  of trade (especiaLty  the intra-
industry division of trade) with rniddte advanced nations, to ass.ist in the devetopment of devetoping countries, and acceter:aie trade by mainta'inin$'domestic  demand for irnports ani f rom thern stabLe suppty of the products they need,,r 
'
lganlrjjjustrial.  strucllure, A Long Range vision, 1g7g, p. 13..-  30,1 -
Judging fron nomina! gronth achieved in the four yeans up to 1979
in sone of the key grorth sectors, it  seems, that at Least in the case of
gener,at machinery and dhemicats, there might be a probteth in achieving the
Erouth target.. Precision nlaglrinCry shbred a 14.t+ per cent noninaI groxth in
iheiouryears;@odarateFriceincreases,thisresu.[t,"
with some tuck, woutd stiLl be in tine llith a 9.5fr average r e a t  grorth
forecast up to 1985. Genera[ machinery on the other hand greu by onl.y an
t'\
I -)
average 10.12 nonlinaLly, and unLess there is a strong upsurge in J9E1-J985
the real target of 7.8I triL[ not be achieved. The same holds true for
chemicatq udrere nominal growth at a 9;4I average annuaL rate betreen 1976 and,
lF  TAas to bq insuffic.ient to reach the 6.9 per cent average grorth
projected over the '1976-1985 period. This assessment is not particutarLy
surprising since, -seen from 1961-, the undertying growth rate of 6.31 tor
this forecast for aLt .industries must be considerbd too high. The nominat
figures used here do not attourhoreverrfor  any judgement to be made on the
relative growth of the sectors.
\
As regards the transition of Japanrs economy to a louer lavet of grouth
(from the prevlous 102 or so'a year. to 5'6Lln and a netr industrial structure
characterised by quaIity and technoLogy pnoduction, the ISC estabtished a
tist of the adaptation processes expected in the main industries.
A number of these were in fact incorporated in the measuies instituted
under the 1978 Specific Recession Industries StabiIisation  Lav. ltlore generpt[y,
it  appears to be broad[y accepted that this'transition viIL take six to eight
years, reckoning from 1978 onnards (1). Of this, three to four years are
expected to be a preparatory phase during uhich {overnment expenditure cAn
ptay'an important growth stimutating rote, uhereas in the fotLoring three or
four the adaptation to a [ower;grouth pattern ril.L be basicaL[y estabtished
and the nert industriaI structure ri It develop .thrciugh increased pr"lvate investnent.
(b) Private Institutes
The private sources used in the follouing section are :  *
(i)  "Long-Tern  Outlook of the Japanese Economy to the Years 19E5
and 1990", trlitsubishi Research Institutei
(i i ) "A Forecadt of the IndustriaI and Export Structure of Japan
untiL 1985",Indust{al  Bank of Japan;
(iii)  Reports by the ilo !,{e_.Research Institutq
(iv)  Surveys by the Njhqq Kq-r3e-l-9!i-q!gn ( a Leading economic nerspaper).
A brief summary of these studies is given'betov"
(i)  The trlitsubishi  Research Institute "Long-Term Outtook of the
Japanese Econ  197E,
is basCd oh a forecast.of the wortd economy-and  related politicaI factors
in conbination with management.of the economy and changes jn privatc con-
sumption. The years 1975-80 correspond,  according to the !lRI, to the.difficul,t
phase of transitio'n.
"..t...
(1) This
is i"n
is the period
Iine rith the
specified by the Nomura Research tnstitute, and
other'forecastst -37 -
ffi[.expenditure:equiva[enttoGNPtess'netexports
of goods and services.
In 1980-E5, the,donestic and.ouerseas  conditions for a rebound'in
business uiLt graduatLy fatt into place. The GNE (1) average annual
groyth rate foiecast flr  1975'85 ls 4.6X, basicatty in Line vith-the
Nomura forecast bUt toyer than the rgovernmentaLt forecast of 5.5f for'
the per:iod 19E1-1985. The trlRl forecast-atso agrees uith the Nomura paper
in considering that for the first  years pubLic expenditure vitt  be an
important grorth stimulant and ttrat from about 1982 on donestic private
demand ri[[  take'over for'aLL se[f-sustained growth.
Tabte 7 provides the titRl forecast of industriat structure and the"
growtfiTa'iiby'sector for 1985 and 1.990, The summary of industriaI
structuraL devetopnents sta,tesl 
.
"The folLoring industries yiLL show higher grouth than that of the - -
industriaL average :  lumber and uood piqducts, printing and pubtishing,
-ceramics and earthHare, meteI products, generaI nrachinery, etectricaI
machinery, precision nachinary, construction,  andt the tertiary industry.
0f theser; lumber and rood products, ieramies and earthen]rare, metat pro-
ducts, and construction ritL be supported by.the, increase in pubtic uorks,
the giorth in privat'e'housing  i.nvestrnent,  and the resuttant strong
domeitic demand. 0n the other hand, the grorth in aLl' the machinery
jndustries, except for transport-machineryr.viLI  be targety due to superior
teihnotog.iiat knou-hor.r which riLL back up their non-price competitiveness.
In partiiutar, despite the fact that domestic  demand for generat machinery,
initre5E'rseciorctassification,ui|[on|.yri'seatowaverageannuat3.91
due to s[ou demand'for jndustriat machinery from private ptant and equipinent
investnent. this ui['[ be covered by grrowth in exports (7.92r.. Production
11itI consequentl.y rise an average forr,the rest of th€ machinery industry.
Demand for off icL inach'inesr. primar,iLy desk caIcutators, for data-rqLated
machines, and precision. maChlnery' uiLl. be strong both domdsticatty
$x to 6i) and in exports (7r to 11Zr.0n the uhole, this may re[[ be
termed a stabLe growth industrY-
tndustries stagnant in the 21-sectm ctassificatidn are the primary
industry, food;tu;is, textites, iron and steet, and transport machinery.
Their 
"t"r.ge 
annui[ growth rates YiLL each fa[t beLow the 4% LeveL,
being 3.0X: 3.22' 1.1 to 1.5X;3.7 and 3.9X respectivety.
Transport rachinery urjLL be stagnant  because of the strong impact of the
shipbui tding Oepression resuttiig ftrom'a rlorLduide .surpLus'of tonnage.
Sehind the lLoydorn in the iron and steeL industry are changes in the  :
pattern of pubtic uorks (from production to Living-retated  projects), the
shipbuiLding depression, reiource c'onservation in nbchinery, and olher
facions depiessing domestic depand and the dawn of the "era of orderly
exports,'. Foodstuifs and textiLes wil.L aLso be sLov because of changes in
consumption  pat'terns, with a resuttantLy tou grouth in doqestic demand,
anJ 
"n'increase 
in imports from semi-advanced  countries on top of that."
...1....,r  i  .3?-  j o r*  '
(ii)  The fo,recist of the IndustriaL Benk gf Japan (a leading credit
body) assumes thiee atternative GNP growth nates for: the period up-to
,  1985 (1). ElectricaL  machineny uiLt be the main grorth sector according
to the IBJ (see tabtg,8). Ttre non-groith sectors are expected to be-ship-
buitding irnd ship-iebair-(with negative rates), other transport equipment,
and texti les.
TabLe 9 compareS the forecasts by the ISC, ttlitsubishi and Industriat
eank;E:[tThich witt be the future growth industries..  A consensus emerges
from the tabte that eLectrica  inerl vil[  Ue future
groL,th industrjT, Brysts  ffither  ride[y.
The degree of disaggregati'on in the forecasts is too low to reftect changes
uhich lnay be sigr.rif j ca.nt trithin an .industry. AIthough the overatI chealicaL
sector ii  given only medium growth'expectations,  i  shift f.rom intermediate
products to fine chernicaLs  gnd so to pharmaceuticats is indicated in the
ittorr.. foreclffiTffin'es'even  c tffiill-Ervey  cbvering future
strategic groxth products of 22 Leading chqmicaI companies in J!pl{t; these
groyth products are atmost exc[usiveLy in the pharmaceuticaL and fine c.henicaI
seitor (see !.abLe. 10).
tr:ansport maghinery, ingluiing cars, is aIso not considered to be a
futur  nd cars wiLt be taken over in-
creasingLi  Uy ttre NIGs so far as products incorporating-Lor and medium
technoLogy  are concerned. As regards-cqrs.  the i.mpac$ of mounting pnessure
against Jipatese Car:expoFts,  the deveL'opment of sub-compact  crars in the
Uiitea Staies and direct investmerits .abroad, have been'taken into account
by nedrLy aLt the studies (see aLso trlRl comment).  Japanese car manufacturers
are.therefore  expected to shift graduattl to more expensive types, vith
etectronie components,  energy.-saving devi.c€s, Luxury interiors, etc.
(iii)  The Nomura for,eclsts ref[ect the growth assessments of various
industries, ref]Ed-fi tIETnFituters  orrn assessment; 5I averaOe economic
grogth for-1978-85 was assuned.  The advantage of the NRI approach is that
it  adopts a nore disaggregated appCoach than the other studies (jt  takes a
7? industry break-dorn from a[[ sedtors), thus enabLing high grorth product
categorie5rithinparticu[arsectorstop9identifjed.TabLe11.(a)9ives
27 citegories' whicl, He"e estinated 'to achieve an annua't-mF;liE:iil6duction
increasi of 5X jn real terms over the period 1978-85. ttledicaL equipmelt
(grouth rate 15X), foLlored by computer$, autopqrtgr 9upLicatilg paclil,j?9s
and tirepieies (O-14"92 growth-TEte)--ie expectad to perform best. Thi'[e
cheniffi-E-eneral  are not in the high gronth group, tithin this sector
pffim  tica[s, cosmetics and fine chemica[s (dyestuffs) uere identificd
as high grouth areas.  i
@  production7.4%
Case II:  GNP 5.7"/., production 6-1t
Case III:  GNP 3.87.2 p.roduction 4.27ol -33-
ffi980.weceg81.5bn,compa.redUithaforecastfi9ure
ol g 64.9 bn (tabLe 13). If  the Iinear trend underLying the.de.facto
performance since 1974 continues untit 1985, the resutt tJou[d be machi-
nery,exports of I  122.1 bn, 'i.e. a performance in tine vith the original
forecast
9
2.
of
,iiUte ii  (ll  provides an anaLysis bf the 72 selected industries,
anaiffit6'efactorsforgrorth(price/votume;rhetherthegrorth
narket is expected to be donestic or.export; and rhether the growth uit!
be in existing products or neu products)'
(iv)  The'Nihon [eizai ShimQun (leading eponomic nerrspoper) conducts
aregu[aresandproductioncapacitydevetopments
"ron6 
the Zr40O companies registered on tfre Tokyo stock exchange. fable 1?
indicates yhich ,".io",  are'expected to sbov more than a 15/ capaclffi
'increase betueen tilarch 1981 and trlarch 1984 on the basis of the tatest surYil---
(pubLished in llarch 1981). In'summary,'the highest capacity gronth.(over 100U)
is expected in video taoe-rqcPrders-  \arge-scate.integraled circuils and
machjning centrgs, !,ith.duPLicating- machinege,?!'jtt flatches as veLt as some
industrial mach'ines inctm  t
ffiyfo|.|orrin!behjnd(withananticipatedcapacityincrease
ffi+,ox,.BicomparisontoasimiLarsurveyconductedint|arch1979,
the automotive sectoi centering around midget.cars and motorqyctqs is aLso
emerging as a rapid grouth indtrstry. The genefif picture projected by these
..p"iiti  increase'forecasts is in Line rith the other forecasts'and vith the
actuat deveLopments  over the tast thro years
Future structure of. Japanfs Externat Tr?de
The reports deatt wjth above contain forecasts on the future devetopment
Japanrs externat economic reLations, i.e. exports and imports
(i)  tbg-M folg!-e-g!. Tabl"e 11 gives the expected changes in
exporffie  EilTI-fs  summarised  below
In the case'of'machin"ery,  the Largest export sector and-lhal vhich
cbrries Japanrs tectrfrillffi'tensive  restructuring hopes, " llry"advance 
.
in exports'.is conjectured-(a  gronth of,8,4% a year betueen 1980 and 1985
in reat. terms, thl,second highest rate). t{liLe the CQmmunity sends around
Z0-E0f of its'machinery exports to advanced nat'ions, Japanrs percentage
is around 551, most of yhich.consists of.cars and househoLd appLiailces.
h,ith the deveiopment of fieLds such as electronics,  etectronica[ly-equipped
machinery and precision instruments, "Japan witL increasingty participate
in markets whi'ch untit norl she has ieft to the industries of other advanced
countries. The vaLue of machinery exports is forecast to increase,to
S 1ZO bi il.ion by 1985; tnachihery exports hive in fact been increasing
faster than Projected (1).
chemicats are expected to be the most rapidty growing expor-!-.?eqlor
(1jT;@.  At present about 301 of JapanrS exports of chenicats 9o to
devetoped countrie.s and 54X to,LDCs (fertilisers, basic materiaL for
piastil resin). The shift to pioducts with a higher degree of sophisti-
cation and val.ue nhich.is expected to take plafe is Like[y to increase
'  tr  '1"'I,
'*
Japanrs competitiveness on third mankets as HeLL ds on the home merkets
of devetoped countriesr, including  Japan' itseLf. Accord'ing to the.ISC
forecasti chemicaI exports wjLI amount to.some t 23 bitIion in 1985'in
nominaI terms. This figure is l.'ikeIy to prove difficuLt to achieve.
l{hereas the export forecast for chemicaLs for 1980 nas S 10.5 bn, actuat
.exports in 1980 were only t 6.8 bn. A [inear trend projection of the
de f.acto export performance  (from 1974 oil .results.in a forecast for 1985
of 8 8.8 bn. An average annuat growth of ?7% (nominat terms) up to 1985
would be required to reach the figure forecast by the ISC. This does not
seem IikeLy tp happen, even if  one attows for some surprises.
(ii)  The tlitsubishi forecast is basically in line with the ISC
reportsofara@stryisconcerned,butis[essoptimistic
as regards the chemicaI sectoi (in ling'wjth it9 assessnent.that chemicats
pitl. not be a teading grorth industry in Japan). The t{RI estimate of the
export and import structure used'a productioh ctassification of 189 sectors,
cpnsideration being given to the trend of yen appreciation,  the pressure o{
trage risgs, increases in rar materiaI prices and subsequent changes in inter-
nationaL competitiveness. Tabte 14 (a) indicates the pr:ojected share of 21
product groups in total exports in 1985 and 1990, and tabte 14 (b), using the
same materiaL, nanks these groups according to trhether they are expected to
inc.rease their share or not. The export-import stfucture'is broadty characterised
by an increase in exports headed by machinery,  combined with an increase in
imports of manr:factured goods, p.rimdri ly those from Iabour-intensive and
l"ight industries.
(iii)  Industriat Bank, The export structure expectat'ions  inctuded in
the modet 'in-IT6T6-fT6Fffi-st are sumnnarised in tahLg 15.  {
High growth expectations are pLaced on e[ectricaI machinery and
genqraI machinery.'In etectrica[ machinery there is a shift  from audio-
ffiurfVtoe[ectricatmachineryande[ectronicsforpro-
duction use; export of generat machinery is expected to gt"oh, together nith
the growth of plant exports, and the increased internat'ionaL competitiveness
of Japanese machinery in genera[.
(iv)  Nomura. The Nomura f orecast does not: give an expLi ci't 'expor.t
out[ook but inEiEates the sectors in whjch exports are expected to contri-
bute as a growth factor" These sectors are tisted in tqbte 18. A compiLatjon
of avaiLabLe forecasti from different sources nas pubIished  by.Nomura in
1980, houever, f rom which the data in !-abt3-_1p have been taken. These cover
estimated production, exports and impprts in 1985 -in motol vehi,c[-es,
cons.umer et,ectroniCs  (incLuding coLour TV and video-tape recorderg), 4!!39
tffid-EGiGs  Eachines,  i
As far as motor vehictes'a1e  conberned,  the data in tabte 16 forecasts
an average 6Z effiFf-gffiTF:Setween  197E and 1985 and a production growth
of 4.4 per cent for the samerperiod; The production grobrth foreoast is about
haf.f what uas achieved in the five years between 1975 * 1979 (average grorth
8.97"r. Exports grehr in the sane period by,13"7i1, more than tuice the 6.12
forecast f i gure.
:
Consumer  electronicq  are expected to remain stagnant in the "traditionat"
sectoiiiJi:86-F66'istiil-Fgat'ive  growth in production and exports. Grouth is
foreseen however for car stereo, videotape recorders and video disc ptayers.
In the etectronjc palts sector, exports are expeqted to grow moderatety by 8I,
productffiome5ticdemandby7.5|between1977-19E5.
tr'-/
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As regards semi-conductorsrit is interesting to note that one Japanese
sorirce beLieves that US production vitt  grow'faster  than'Japanlse
production. FinaLty, as negards bu_siness Tbchines,  pr:oduction betveen
1978 and 1985 is expected to gror,at a,7,772 average pace uhereas exports.
witt stight[y falI behind rith 7.5X. In atI sectors Listed in tabte 16,
as can be easi [y seen, impoits are not expected tb gror op the same scale
as either domestic demand or exports.  \
(v)  @t.  As regards a nationat consensus on Japanese export
.strategy, ISI;T7  gives an'overa[[ sumnary.rhich  ranks the resutts of
tne tniel dnefii Jorecasts-above  and table 18 that of llonura. The resutt
ii  no surpriSe : machiner)l rit!rbe the future nainstay of Japanese exports.J
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CONCLUSION
- Japanr s 'industri.a[ and comtnercial structure i s nou being geared
torards iqcreasing concentration on technotogy intensification. .The
pivot of this process is'the deveLopnent of the machinery sector,
especiaLLy predi'sion and etectronic naChinery. This shift vitI  not be
Limited to a fev sectors, houever, but vitt  manifest itseLf in a range
of indu$tries. GeneraI machinery and communication  systems riLt. great[y- 
:
behefit from Japan's progress in electronic component;  and conputer
technologyt ?s viLt areas sherg Japan has so far'not bee.n especiaLLy
active (e.9. conmunications, defence equipment, aerospace products).
Existing sectors Like shipbuiLding end automobiles ritL be reinforced
so as to maintain their conpetitivity,  even if  production teve[s are
not greatty increased.
,Looking back at the developmeyrt of the Japanese econony since the
Second lJorLd lJar, this process yiIt  eventuat.ty amount to the third p,ost-
var medium-term investment cyc[e; this cycte is atready in progress and
xitt  come into fuLt sving in the next feu years. Energy-saving related
investments niil. hetp to sustain and acteterate the'process. Taking into
account the Strong economic and qociaI basis from vhich Japan proceeds, as
out[ined in the paper, and the various special conditions prevaiLing in
Japan, it  can 'be expected that b:l this restructuring, vhi ch vi Ll. be largety
completed by abo.ut 1985, Japan,rriLL firinty estabtish lrerself as i  teading -
if  not the teading - manufacturer of-a range of products of dn advanced
catibre, nhich uiLL be highl.y competitive on internationat narkets in
quatity and price.
As regards exports, the resuLt is sinitarLy cLear-cut. Export grorth
is expected to take.place mainty in the different nachinery sectors.
0ther sectorsr'incLuding chemicals, can hope for export grouth in the
ctass of sophisticated producls. The technotogy-intensive  products riIt
tend to be narketed in other industriaLised  countries rather than in the
deveLoping countries, To that extent these products viLt be in direct
competjtion with European and United State's prodqcts. There is thug
LittLe consotation in the fact that steet, shipbuitding and cars ritI  no
longer be the principat mainstays of Japanrs exports to Europe and the
United States (and as texti Les.and sundry goods rrere during,the preceding t
pe ri od)
The main question as fegards correcting the present unbatanced
trade retations betueen Europe and Japan uiIt be;rhether, on the one hand,
Japan uiLt be integrated moie ctosety rith the other industrialised
countriesr' through-a greater'diviSion of.labour rith then, s,o that Europe
has a more substantial share of the Japanese narket, vith a[t thc changes
fon Japanrs orn internal eqonorny that this irpties, and, on the other hand,
hoy efficient[y and rapidLy Europe yi[[  be ab.[e to reorganise its ottn'
industriaI structure in order to maintain its position on uortd tnarkets,
as uelt.as in the Community itsel"f.  Europers relative prosOerity  and
industriaI capicity ritl- depend to a considerable  degree on the responsc
given to this question.-t7-
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Sectlon 1.  Japanese 0fficiaL Economic  Plans
Titl.e  loate ot  ' I  Period
loubti cation I  tl rvl
Main objectives Reat annual. GNP
orcirl!r$greet
Rea[ annuaL  GNP
9ro"tf.r Fgfieved
5-Yea r-P t an
for Economic
Independence
New tong-term
Economic. PLan
P[an for
doubting Nat-
ionat Income
Fiedi um-te rm
!cononric Ptan
Ptan.for Econ-
omic and Sociat
Deve topment.
New Ptan for
Economic ancl
SociaI Devet-
cpment
iconomic PLan
or Sebohd Ha[f
,f 1970s
rler Economi  c
md soiiaL T-
rear-p Ian
Dec. 1955
Dec. 1957
0ec.1960
Jan.1965
*
l4arch 1967
May 1974
ttiay 1976
August 1979
Basic Economic lren. teZl
and Sociat  I Ptan  I
1956 -  196A
(5 years)
19s8 -  1962
(5 years)
1961 -  1970
(10 year.s)
196t+, -  1968
(5 years)
1967 - .1971
(5 years.)
197A -  \975
(6 years)
-  1977
years )
1976 -  1980
(5 yeaqs)
1979 -  1985-
(7 years)
1973
(5
economic inde-
pendence, futI
emp Ioyment
maximum  economic
gpouth, improve-
ment of tiv'ing
staniards, fut l.'
emp toyment
,t
correction of
economic dis-  '
tort i<ins
development of a,
ureLt baIanced.
wetfare society
creatibn of a
comfortab Le
envi ronment 
t
t hrougli we L t  ba L-
anced growth
s i mu Itaneous
achievement  of
nat i ona  L
pnosperity  and
internationaL  l
harmony 
]
achievement  of  . ]
stabLe eco.deveto(
and enrichment of]
peop!qiq tiVes 
I correctlon OT , 
I
i mba tances  I
between economic  i
sectors, indup- 
| trial  restructur-!
ing, surmounting I
of energy short- 
| ages, creat'lon 
I of a new pros- 
|
perous Japanese  I society  I
6.5%
7.2%
8.1%
E;2t
10.6%
9.4'l
5.7%
8.7
9.97,
10.7%
10.6',1
10.97:
6.1'l
4.1%
5.7
1979 = 6.1 %
1980 = 4.8Y, (est)
1981 = 5.3% (of'
ficial on
Hook )
SOurce :  Economi c Ptann'ing Agency,  Japan..Ul
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SECTION 3 (A) : YE}T EXCHANCE  RATE .TABLES
ffi
(a) 0ther currencigs/yel
The fotLowing tabLe shows the equivatent
Dn, FF, UK pound and Ecu.
in yen of ,on€ US doltar,
Yen
ralu of 1e5d 1971 '1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1e80 Jan
19E1
Feb
1 9E1
18
1 Drq
1 FF
1 UKL
1 Ecu
360
85.7
1.03
1,008
360
350
96.1
64.E
855.9
351
308
?6.2
58.9
709.1
345.5
27?
1 00.7
59.5
650.6
335.0
291.5
112,8
60'.6
680.3
347 -7
296.9
120.5
68..9
657.9
368.3
296.5
1'17,9
62,03
535,7
331.5
2#E.5
115'.6
54.6
468.7
306.4
210:4
144.7
,46.6
403.9
?68.1
?19.1
11.9.5
5? .5
464.9
300.3
226.7
124.7
'i3.6
527.1
315.6
201.9
94.4
43.5
4E5.9
?59.8
245.35
95.8
41.4
471.4
247.8
(b) Yen/other currencies
The table betow give the equivalent in the various currencies of
1 1000 yen.
4.87
10.44
2,4.15
2.12
4.03
*  Notes on fluctuations in exchange rates betveen 1950 and 1971.
1) Yen/dottar.  Between 1950 and 1971 (thp Smithsonian  agreenent)
ryli"yed  at the same vatue (360 -'35? ven to the doU'ar) .
2, Y."/Dttl. There'vas no change betreen 1950 and 1960 (1 Dll = + 85.7).
.  3) Yen/FF. 1950 -  1956,1 FF = + 1.05; 1957' 1 FF = T 0.86; 1958
'  aaffi,  1 FF = +'0.73" .rn 1960 the French franc vas changed (1 ner
F. .frtnc.= 100 oLd francs) and from 1960 to 1968 I  (ner) FF = T 73.
1969,1FF=+:0.0.
4) YenlUK pound. Betteen 1950 and 1g6i,6t 1 pound = Yen 1rO08; 1967'-
1970 = Yen 857.8
.
rate for the Ecu/Eua. is  from J958 ontyl
Sources : Eurostat. UN, tlinistny of Finance Japan.
5) Yen/Ecu, The erci ung"
2,7V9
11.67
972.2
0.992
2.7V8
3.247
10.39
16.9
1.41
2.89
3.674
9,93
1 6.80
1:54
2;98
3.7?4
8.6s
1 8.31
?.13
'3.26
4.751
9.55
?1 -46
2.47
3.73 r 3P33
4.95
1 0.59
22.99
2.06
3.85q'l
SECTION 3 (B)
EFFECT 0F qXCHANGE  RATE FLUCTUATToT{S  Al'rp CoTTIPARATTVE  PRTCES oil EXTERNAL TRApE
The tabl.es above provide historicaL information  about exchange rate
ftuctuations in nominat terms, rhich are of course only one etenent in thc
determination of export and import competitivity.
In assessing changes in Japanrs internationat trade conpetitivity,
it  is more useful to consider the real effectivb eichange rate of the yen(l),
which takes account not only of the exchange rate of the yen against  a
weighted basket of other currencies, but atso the disparity in the rate
of inftation between Japan and its iompetitors. The definition of the yen
reaI effective exchange rate and its fluctuations in the period 1973-79 are
set out in the bJhite Paper on Internationat Trade 1980, Sunmary, page 20,
ftg.Z-Zrattached"
As regards Japan's expoit prices, it  js noted in the Uhite Paper that
during the period of yen appreciation in 1977-1978, export prices (in dotlar
terms) r.ose to a considerab[e.extent, in tine yith the yen; during the 1979
yen depreciation,  however, export prices did not drop to  the sane extent.
Japanrs strategy of ilncreasing its  concentration of exports in areas
uith a high vatue-added  content as HeLI as a high technology content shoutd
enabLe it  to achieve a decLining price'etasticity of demand for exports.
Thus if  the strategy proves successfut, future changes in the reaL effective
exchange rate of the yen may not cause the same degree of moderation  of
votume growth of Japanese exports as might previousLy  have been anticipated.
l,lith regard to imports, the 1980 hrhite Paper states that the
eLast'icity of manuf actured 'imports to price is high (1.29 for the period
1966-1979 .  This means that, ceteris paribus, a 1/ dectine in conparative
prices of imports r.lould resutt in a 1.292 ]ncrease in 'inport votr"nre). I'f
accordingIy the Japanese reat effective exchange rate appreciates,  imports
of manufactured goods in general can be expected to increase quite rapidty.
Holever, this m'ight be expected principaLLy to benefit products yith a
reLativety lor value-added  and technoLogy content, since they could be
expected to disptace competitive Japanese goods more easity.  Imports of
ray materiats cary on the cther hand, be expected to be price inetastic,
except perhaps in the Long term.
The effects described  above are in any case subject to a time Lag;
thus adjustments to trade'vo[umes may not occur immediateLy in response to
an increase in the real effective yen exchange rate.  It  is not possible,
furthermore, to abstract exchange rate variatjons'from other factors, such
as the levet of domestic  demand, vhich can either reinforce or offset the
effect of exihange rate variations (2)
In conc[usion, whiLe the nominaI exchange rate of the y"n r"y
'appreciate, the extent to which the reaL effective exchange rate of the
yen wou[d fotLon suit is,uncertain, having regard to Japan!s rEarked
capacity for adjustment, described in the paper, and reLated factors (e.g,
the lower rate of Japanrs domestic 'inftation by comparison yith her
industriat competitors,  and the moderate teveL of rage incneases, etc.).
To the extent to which real yen appreciation occurs, houeverr'this is
Likely to timit  Japanrs export performance.
(1)  Often knorn as the index of
(2)  See the comment on p. 16 of
competitiv'ity.
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Grr|eRAt REVTEVV OF JAPAN',S fOn€lGN  lnAO€
Fig.2-1. lmpact of Yen Fluauationr on tho
Balance of Trade
(trdtronl  ltl  l<umoth,ghv;n,.t.
An*b  ot Ciaqt  6 tu  Gault  6
lalX sd.'  ol l9rt,  d  rha U€  al tn-
Nota: ,, tha nrrl Efir,ttrr Exdtotrgr  Rorr b dcnotsd bi tho
followlag formul&:
R.E.Ex. Btn-nu A! , =wlt, t  Riio jwi weft
.  I .Counw
s;- (Msnufoctur.d  oxportt'ham Jrptn to I counnyl '  manLfrcturcd  importr. to hpn frun I countryl  + tho
sum ol 14 countrias' n nuftaurcd  axnTts  lrcm Jepn +
mpnulacturad  lmpont to JoNn
Ejit- rhe cuftancy cxchange  roto of i country ag.intt
tho yen (deaominatod ln ycnl .t aima  ?.
Bjio = Thc tveragc  currency cxchengc ratc af i countty
against the yen (danominatcd  in yon) in thc firtt htlf ol
t973.
WPli: Tho wholcslo prh. lnd.x of lnduttrial  goodt ol I
countfv,
WPlj: Th. wholcalo pricc indcx oI induttri.l  goortt ol '  Jaqon'
2. Manufactured  good, cxPon'inpon  nllo o lMonulac'
twad cxgort volumol /lmtnu ltcturod import  tolumol.
Saesontlly  edJuttcd.
3. Alt tha ligwes erc lndoxd wiah thoo of aht lina htil
ol 1973 rct *  l0O.
Sourtrr,:  Grikoku Eooki Geikyo lTho Summtry  Rapon Tredt
of Jann);. lMF.lMS: Kcitti Tokci Gcppo (Econmth
Statittict Monthly)
(31, Thoiul rffocllvr  uchtogr rnrl  lrkcr inlo rcrount
not only thc exchango  rat3 aSain3l  .tho U.S. dollar but rlso thc
dirprrity ln thc rate of Inflstion within Japan rnd rbrord. rr
wcll ar the movcment of thc ycn agrintt othct cuttcncler.
3.  Trends in the Japanese Economy
Mrile Japan'i.Gconomy  continucd to cxpand in
1979, it witnessed an upturn of wholesllc pticca due lo
pricc increases of oil and other imported raw materials;
all.amplified by the decline of the yen's value  (see
Figure 2-3). In contrast, consumer'Prices  remained
relatively  calrn, although they are beginning to feel the
increases  in wholesale  prices.
Fig.2-3, Rate of Wholesals Prica Increare or
Decrease after Eliminating  tho
Exchange Rsto Factor
8i
t
I
I
@nr ot le tA
l2d uar  ol tltll
{lrd qnr  al lttll
lrt  JoM ol t*  vr. rrr.
: lari .d*  a, lttt
lrn6 g.r  ol ltttl
--  tln oar  of lttt
ll.r der'  ol |tol
l3'd a.'nr .t ltt9
ffi;*ii--i--ffi,.t
*rt-.-r  L-*;OJ  t-lt.  lFl
Notc:  Thaoxpon-impod  btlrnccwri obt incdbY @mputlq
thc impact of thc yen rate lluctuationt agpinst thc
dollar in nch quarter through thc usa of oxpart-
import lunctions,  etc.
Sonrrrc.' Oaikoku Boeki GaikYo (Externel Totlc Ovcrvicw);
Production.  shiptnent & inventory ttatistics; Bukka
Shisu Gcppo lPricc lndcx Monthlyl; UN'MBS
2.  Drastic Changes in the Yen Rate
The yen's exchange  late against the dollar fcll
drastically  during 1979. The recovery of tru$t in thc
t,.S. dollar was one reason for this chang,c. Basically,
however, the chrnge was primarily due to the tum'
around in Japan's trade balance, which posted a deficit
in mid-year, and large red.ink figures in the balance of
payments. The decline of the yen rate seems to have
6ein further accelerated by psycholo$ical factors
relating io the unstabte oil situation. ln early April 1980'
however, the yen's exchange  rate against the dollar
turned up, due in part to the decline in interest rates in
the Ll.S.
tn terms of the real effective  exchange rate (3) thc
yen was apparently fluctuaiing at a relatively low levcl
during 1979 (see Figure 2'2).
Fig. 2-2. . Change in the Real Effective  :
Exchange Rate and Manufactured
Goods Export'lmport  Ratio
{indexed)
tno€Qdld  rt at.i.4  ra! &ri  -
l(tlvt[trlrYtrlrlv
sttr  g--..rt  --..  t-.-n  ir
A.ld  $d-a  tla  dtd  t
-AtiDti.l6td,r|pr
witui  t.6  e,--  o, r!'t
"-d  dldrt'tit.4h.F  r,lr it
I
I
a  -.lrrrt'{.r.EE.ar.
.  t9, l. l0  t fin rv. ,.t.t,vr  p.€
,'t  --.M..ulrr,'rtFd r\  rrFn  rmo/r  rirro.
7h. tmrr,ct ol thi ,an.tdr.rve  rrta |toctu.tlont  on
whotoolo pricu ol lmponad .nd cxponod goodt tro
camput d wtth functiottl lormube'
Eukkt Shitu GQpo (Ptico lndaxa ilonthlyl; Tunn
tokci ltndustri.,  St.tittic;t Monthlvl; Monthly bbot
tt.ai.tics: MinittrY ol Fhlr'nct dttt; UN'MBS
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INCREASE IN JAPANIS  PRODUCTIVITY
Starting from a very low base after the Second tlor[d l{ar, the
rate of macro-economic productivity growth in Japan has consider:abLy
outstripped that of at t the ttlember States (1),  NevertheLess as the
fotLow'ing tabLe shows, the leveL of productiv'ity in the Japanese
economy is stitl  somewhat belou that of the EC as a HhoLe, though
considerab[y above the Level. of ltaLy and the UK (2)
Productivi t teveLs : GDP/civi t nt, 1970-78
at 19lS rr ces 1978
at
1978
pr i ces
(,000
UCE)
1970
Civi L  Productivity
emptoymrt ('000 ucE/
( t000)  head)
rye.
Civi L  Productivity
empIoymrt ('000 UCE/
head)
J apan
USA
EEC
Ge rmany
F rance
Ita ty
U. K.
5On94O  6"24
78,627  13.95
1O1 ,769  9.51
26,169  11.74
20,393  11.01
181514  7.42
z4;?3  6.86
54,080  8.8
94 1373  15.1?
102,050  12.03
?4r7AO  15.50
20,912  14.6
19,93?  8.61
24,564  8.20
14.?8
17.57
15.22
?0.33
17.87
1 0.25
9.89
Source :  GDP -  Eurostat, NationaI Accountsr '1980
EmpLoyment-OECD, Labour Force Statistics
This overal. L view obscur"es the fact that the spread of productivity
betgeen sectors is far greater in Japan than in the EC. The productivity
levet of the agricuLture, forestry and fishing sector in Japan tras onLy
251( of that of manufacturing in generaL in 1977 G).  Since a relativety
high proportion of the rorking popuLatjon (4.57, in 1977) is stiIt  engaged
in-agr.icutture,  i t  can be expected that the normal transf er of l"abour to
othei sectors uiIL provitJe a considerabte inpetus for further productivity
gains. In contrast, 'in most EC countries (withl the exception of Greece,
itaty  and Irel-and), this source of productivity ga'in'is notrt aLmost
exhausted. tlhoLesa['ing and retai l.,ing (ri th 17'l of the Japanese  Labour
force in '1977) also have a very Lorl productivity [eve[ 
..t..
(1)  The pattern fotLowed has been simitar in both the EC and Japan: r'ising
in the 1950sr.a steep increase in the 1960s, and a sharp fatl  back after 1973
to less than ha[f the rate for the previous period.
Labour productivity per unit hour rose on average by 8.2/ a year in Japan
betyeen'1960  and 1978, as compared uith 3.4/. in the US and 3.?l tor the UK.
(Source: l,lhite Paper on InternationaL Trade 1980).
(2) In the absence of pufchas,jng power parities for Japan, a simpLe catculation
of GDp in a common currency divided by civiL emptoyment  has been used.
(3) In France for the same year the conparabLe figure uas 462.Even as far as manufacturing  industry is concerned, the overatt
teveI of productivity in,1978 nas on[y approximatety three-quarters of
that of the Federat Repubtic of Germany. t{ithin the nanufacturing
sector there are a,Lso great variations in productivity.  As is demonstrated
by the foLloning tabLe, it  is in these sqctors of th'e Japanese economy
trhich participate strongl-y in uorLd trade that productivity is high and
exceeds the EC [evet.  l'
.lapan : troO  C1975 = 100)
..t..
(1)  The industries cited incLude the famitidr success stories : rnachinery
and equipment and, in particu[br, -transport nachineiy.
1973 1976 1977 1978 1979
rl .
'1980
(fi rst
quarter)
1973 - 79
T
groyth p.a.
ELectri  c
nachi nery
Radio, TV
receivers &
audio e-euir
ment
lrlotor vehi-
c Ies
Precision,
maChi ne,ry
03.4
02.1
9,7.3
89.1
1
1
19?.3
149J
114.4
124.1
136.0
14i5.:  -1
102.9
I
164.2
161.4
..
149.8
192.?
es-9
l
194.1+
1 59.1
118.2
2t+7.8
221.O
17tr;5
141.0
303.1
11 .1
7, '7
3.3
18.6
Iron & steel
'Shipbui Ldi ng
r08.9
I 02.6
711.3
82.1
112.E
71.4
119.q
52.1
139.7
.57.1
147.'g
75.5
4.2
-6.3
-  Source : Productivity Research Institue, rJapan Productivity  Centrer'1980
'*, 
l
The rates of grotrth of productivity in these sectors far ex'ceed those
in the EC. Quite remarkable is the groHth from the average for 1979 to the'
flrst  quarter of 1980. Even vithi.n these high productivity sectors, houever,
there are considerabLe  variations in productivity leveL!, betveen the mbin
manufacturing companies and their sub-contractor-s.  Thus a study produced
by the VDA (German Car Manufacturers Association), shors that uhi [q Japanese
car producers themseLves have a higher product,ivity leveL than their German
counterparts, the overatL.productivity  LeveL of thb Japanese car industry is
lower, as a resuLt of the Lorl levet of productivity of the component  sub-
contractors. (Sirb-contractors produce 67"1+l of the'vatue of a car in Japan,
as compared uith 55.2%'in Germany, according to the VDA study.)
The I{ITI llhite Paper on InternationaL Trade 1980 pointed out that betreen
1970 and 1976, the number of i4dustries uith a vatue-added productivity rate
increase of nore than 402 increased from three to ffve (1).  It  enrohasised the
need for a continuation of this trend towards. exports rith  increased vatue-
added droduct:ivity, so as to promote the devetopment of the horizontaL
division of taboOr Hith lqedium Developed Nations of South East Asia.45
ALthough the exptanation for this r?Fid grorth. in prod'uctivity
is undoubtedl.y  complex, it  i5 one more aspect of the Japanese skitt at
achieving success in key areas. One rnajor reas6n Lies in the high
ratio of gross fixed capitaL formation to GDP, as shown in the fottoring
tab [e.
Raiio of Gross F,il!,ed Capita.L Fgrmation !o Gross Domestic Ploduct
1970 1975 1979
J APAI{
u. s.A.
E. E. C.
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
U. K.
35.4
17.3
22.9
25.6
23.3
23.1
18.4
3?.2
16.3 
,
?1,3
,?4.7 .
23.?
20.6
19.5
3|.6
17..9
?o.7
2?.9
21.3
18.7
17'.5
Source : U.S, Department of Commence : InternatjonaL Econonic
Indicators, Sept. 1980 and EUROSTAT
. The factors Leading to increased productivity,have  shifted from
time to time.  Thus whiLe ih the 1960s the contributiori of capital
investment uas dominant, after 1976 the 16te of rationatisation  and
tabour-saving  fdciLities, and the effects of a substantiaIty neduced
nunber of peopte employed and hours xorke{, became inrportant.
So far as comparative Leve[s of jnvestment in particutar sec.tors
are concerned,  the foLlouing figures shou that in the car jndustry thb
Lgvel of investment in Japanras far higher than in either Europe or the
ui during the 1970s
Share oI ilvestment in tota! v?Lue a.9CSq in 4ajof 'motol^-'car 'prqflucerl
structureLs de It industrie
Source : Commission
- 
automobite
staff : Les chartgements
europdenne, 1973-78  '.
4 main U.S.
compant es
10 main Euro-
pean companies
3 main JaPanese '  companies
51.8
35.5
/.
z
. rl ..45.
As a resutt of the high Levet of investment/, the k'ey Japanese
manufacturing industries have an extFemeLy hi gh, technoLogica[.  Levet.
.  The,car industry aLone absorbs hatf of the 101000'robotics.produced
evefy year, far in excess of totat. EC production. It  has also been
suggested that the Lag between R. & D. expend'iture and its effect on
output is much shorter in Japan than in most EC countries and t.he US.
is
rwv .  . "tt
Sicfron 5  EyoL,utigl of_Gl.o-baI Fxports in Sectors (va[ue,an.d percqntage
share, EC, US, Japan, .
Non-e,tectricaL machinery ,  ,  ' \#
- 
Motor vehicLes
Value (8 bn.)
EC (extra) US
Peqcentage share (1)
EC  US  Japan
197A
1973
1977
1978
1979
11
1,9
37.8
44.4
49.6
8.4
12.2
22.5
26.6
32.4
2
4.3
10.1
14.3
15
4?
4tl
44
43
42
32
28
z6
?6
'?7
E
10
12
1lr
13
ELectricaL machingry  '-
1970
1973
1977
1978
1979
4.4
7.5
16.6
19.9
22.3
3
5.1'
10.4
12.
14.5
2.4
4.7,
11.1
13.8
14.6
3?
36'
37
37
36
26
24
23
?2
24
2Q
?2
25
26
?4
1970
'1973
1977
1978
1979
6.1
10.3
18,E
?1.3
25
3.6
6.1,
11.?
13'3
'15
1.9 
.
4.9
14.3
19
20.7
39
37
33
31
33
23
?2
21
?0
20
12
17
25
28
27.
Chemi ia Ls
197Q
1973
1977
1978
1979
6.2
11.1
21.,6
26.5
3?.7
3.8
s.E
10.9
13.7
18.8
1;2
?.1
4.3
5.1
6.1
44.
!+7 t'
47
46
45
27
z4
23
24
26
9
9
9
9
E
(1) ...,4n this and foLLowilg tabLes, remainjng'percentage is that of other
0ECD countries.hs
Iron and Steet
Texti [es  \
1970
1973
1977
1978
1979
3.8
6.9
10.9
14.3
16.7
1.3
1.3
1,7
1.8
2.4
2.8
5.3
10.5
11.9
14.1
38
41
38
40
39
13
8
6
5
3
29
32
36
34
33
1970
1973
1977
1978
1979
2.7
4-6
6.3
7.2
8.5
0.6
1.2
2.0
7.2
3.2
1.7
2.4
3.7
3.8
4.0
43
43
41
41
41
10
12
13
1?
15
28
23
24
??
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TABLE 7
Forocaet of Ind.ustrial Structure
1.2
0.5'
6.1
. 0.8
2.3.
1.7
1.5
t.2
3.8
5e
(lvera6o a.nnual growth rate from LpJ!
a,ncl percent distribution of produotion)
E9crltq7,
r-2i
2.7
3,9
2.9
0.E
{.1
3.8
1.7
3t9
3.6
{.6
.i
3.1''
1.5
5.6
1.0
l.T
.3.5
3.r
5.3
0.5
L.2
10.7
40.?
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43.9
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{.3
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Sources l,litsubiohi Rosearch lnstitute
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!lTABLE  9 52
RanJcing of  .Soven Orowth fndustrieg within
l,ia"nufacturing Industry Forecasts tor t975-95
by IndustriaL Structure Counci [2" t'litsubisff1.
Rlsearch Institute and Industriat Bank of'd'apan
ISC
(r75 tase)
rsc
('75 rase)
IBJ
(case II)
IB'
(caso frr)
!mI
Precision l{achiuery
General lrlachinerXr
l'letal Producte
Electrical. Machinery
Chemicale
r  Other l.lanufacttues
Tra.neBort  Machinery
Cenent, Stone, Ceramios
Paper, hrlp 
,
Printing, Pu-blighing
Lunber, Wood, !\uniture
Iron and Stee1
Petrochemica,Is, etc.
I
,2
3
4
,
6
|'7
J
4
3
6
I
,l
2
5'
6
I
2
3
I
4
6
.5
7
L
,
5
2
3
2
5
I
4
6
;
4
3
7
Sor,uce:-
ISC -
l'Inl -
IBI -
Industrial Structure Cotucil;  Longterm Vision l'975 Uaition
Ilitsubishi Roeearch Institutel  A Longtem Outlook, 1978
Industrial Bank of Japanl Japanrs Econoqy: A I'ledliuntenn outlook of
the Induetrial Structure,  L977-lt
,a TABLE 10  E4
Siretegio Productg of !\rturs for Japa'lre Indlvialual
,  Chenical - Conpaiios (Baoed on .[ Survey)
Narne . of Compa4gr
lnnual Sal.es
L977/7s
(ura ten) Strateglo Grortb Froductg
:  1.  Surnitomo bhonical  M7  . ph'arnaceuticals a$d agricultural chenicala,
special qrnthetic resing
2.  I'litsubishi Chenical,  546  pharmaceutical.s  end a€ricrrltural. cheoicalol
(especiartv .?"1"":Tpl1I" 
!_i1l "), . speciar
E  rynthetic resine, 
- houeing. constnrction
ioatEriale, pnoducte relatlqg to footlstuffg
3. rrtitsui roatsu chemicarg 3oe  :H:T:i":fff,Hrf[m:***al 
cbenissli,-
,  ' {. . tfitsubishi Petrochenicel 268  special gra.de pol;rners (Itractional pollmers},
I  pharrnaceuticale
i
,.  Mrtsui Petrochenical  f93  epccial synthetic reains (ertremely thin
Irrcluetri€s  filn,  eynthotic pulp)r fine chenicale
6.  .TDK Electronios  I13  spocial s;'nthotio reein (inpact-resigtaat
,,  resin), inorgamlc fine cbenicals  (Uonon
nitricle)
,  I,  T6a6ooei Chenical  63  spontaneous super adhesirrqr bousing
Indrrstry
treatment  a€snr
8.  Tokqylrna Soda  116  ion oxcha,nge diephragu (for osnoaio),
ceramics
g.  Japan gynthetic Rubber  fO4  special qrnthetic resins (salf-digagtirre
rosin, butadiene reein)
ts lO.  Nippon Zeon  92  meclical equi$ment.and related" produc'
lartificial  liver),  paeJcagipg a4d other
products for d'istri,butiou qysteas
ltr;  Kuroha Chomical Industry  Id'  antl-cancer druge, carbon fibre
12. Asali Cli,r;a  3U  ion oxcha.nge d.iaphragn (cauetio soda
,  .  production), glaes reinforcad concrete
13.  Nippon Petrochenical'  I?O  unwoven oloth, EBHr SAS
14.  Sbowa Denko  '  372  pharmaceuticelsr now ttrryer of ceranio
products